Is Storytelling a Biological Adaptation?

Abstract

Verbal storytelling -in a sense broad enough to include all forms from casual conversation across oral folklore to written literature -seems to be a universal human activity and has thus been considered an evolutionary adaptation several times in the past few years. The fact that a particular trait is a specieswide universal, however, does not automatically make it an adaptation; it could also be a contingent universal, that is, a cultural behavior which notably relies on biological substrates and therefore emerges in similar fashions in all human cultures, times, and milieus. Yet verbal storytelling is not only universal but also distinct to our species. The uniqueness of a trait can indeed be indicative of a biological adaptation 1 in that we have reason to assume that this trait emerged newly in the given animal lineage and thus might owe its existence to the process of natural selection. However, since verbal storytelling completely depends on language, that is, another uniquely human faculty, 2 the uniqueness of storytelling is hardly surprising and cannot serve as a conclusive argument for considering storytelling itself to be a specifically selected trait. Storytelling could simply be a particular use of language (though we shall see below that the relationship between language and narration is a little more complicated). A third possible indication of a biological adaptation, however, is the fact that storytelling seems to be a notably self-rewarding activity. It occurs on a much larger scale than would seem justified by rational choice or other reasons. As fitness-enhancing behaviors should, as a rule, be intrinsically motivated under certain conditions, the unusually high frequency of 30 1 Note that this is not to say that, conversely, a trait has to be distinct to a species in order to be an adaptation. There are many adaptations which we have in common with other species (socalled "homologues," which derive from common ancestors, and "analogues," which result from comparable selection pressures). 2 Though much more of the capabilities involved in producing and understanding language than previously thought can also be found in other animals (cf. Hauser and Fitch 2003), there are strong reasons to assume that human language in its present form, i.e., as an incomparably sophisticated design for "grammar," is a distinct adaptation of the human species (cf. Pinker 2003); see also Donald 1991, pp. 236-261.

La narrazione come incontro

“…Più in generale, sottolinea la necessità di qualsiasi teoria adattazionista della narrativa finzionale di presentare predizioni precise che si concentrino specificamente sulla narrativa rispetto ad altri tipi di discorso o scrittura. Finché questo non sarà fatto, le discussioni che dibattono se la narrativa, come distinta da altri tipi di produzioni verbali, sia radicata in un adattamento o emerga come un sottoprodotto di altre attività cognitive (Pinker 2007;Mellmann 2012) rischiano di arenarsi.…”

“…Non ci occuperemo di altri resoconti adattativi della finzione narrativa, quelli che sostengono che lo storytelling ha benefici adattativi non legati alla simulazione -per esempio, come veicolo di informazioni relative al sostentamento (Scalise Sugiyama 2001), come dispositivo per migliorare la coesione sociale (Dissanayake 1979), o come modo di dare un senso agli eventi (Bietti et al 2018). Questi resoconti possono essere accurati o meno, ma di solito possono essere applicati al di là della fiction sensu stricto, alla comunicazione linguistica o alle arti in generale (Mellmann 2012). Di conseguenza, questi resoconti di solito si soffermano su categorie più ampie come lo 'storytelling' in un senso che include le narrazioni non finzionali, il gossip, ecc.…”

Why people die in novels: testing the ordeal simulation hypothesis

“…More generally, it underscores the need for any adaptationist theory of fiction to come up with precise predictions focusing specifically on fiction as opposed to other kinds of speech or writing. Until this is done, discussions debating whether fiction, as distinct from other kinds of verbal productions, is rooted in an adaptation or emerges as a byproduct of other cognitive activities (Pinker, 2007;Mellmann, 2012) are likely to stall.…”

“…We shall not concern ourselves with other adaptationist accounts of fiction, those that argue that storytelling has adaptive benefits not related to simulation-for instance, as a vehicle for subsistence-related information (Scalise Sugiyama, 2001), as a device to enhance social cohesion (Dissanayake, 1979), or as a way of making sense of events (Bietti et al, 2018). These accounts may or may not be accurate, but they can usually be applied beyond fiction sensu stricto, to linguistic communication or to the arts in general (Mellmann, 2012). Accordingly, these accounts usually dwell on broader categories such as "storytelling" in a sense that includes non-fictional narratives, gossip, etc.…”

Why imaginary worlds? The psychological foundations and cultural evolution of fictions with imaginary worlds

“…This capacity would have evolved either to convey and teach new information (S. Sugiyama, 1996Sugiyama, , 2001 or to simulate the real world (Mar & Oatley, 2008;Morin et al, 2019;Zunshine, 2006). Here we rather assume that humans did not specifically evolve the capacity to tell stories, but they rather create fictions thanks to a range of other adaptations (e.g., language, capacity to simulate, theory of mind; Mellmann, 2012). Yet, because they are highly attractive, fictions can be used to fulfill any evolutionary relevant purpose that needs others' attention to be caught, be it signaling one's values to potential mates (Miller, 2001) or cooperative partners Bourdieu, 2010;Nettle, 2005b;Singh, 2019Singh, , 2020Veblen, 1899), transmitting knowledge (Nakawake & Sato, 2019;Schniter et al, 2018;M.…”