Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?

Abstract

A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According to this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. This essay rejects the diary model's analogy between memory and testimony from one's former self, arguing first that memory and a diary differ with respect to their psychological roles, and second that this psychological difference underwrites important downstream epistemic differences. The resulting view stands opposed to prominent discussions of memory and testimony, which either, like the diary model, treat memory by analogy to what we naively wish to say about testimony, or which instead attempt to extend to testimony the epistemically preservative role of memory.

Lost in transmission: Testimonial justification and practical reason

“…However, the considerations presented here suggest that the transmission theorist must sever the connection between justification and permissible action. Other recent critiques of justification transmission (for example Barnett (2015)) put pressure on the connection between the transmission theorist's notion of justification and internalist rationality. Without a connection to rationality or permissible action it is unclear what content or theoretical interest remains in the transmission theorist's notion of justification.…”

Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater

“…Those sympathetic to such a view could substitute an example where you receive non-imagistic information about the color of a wall. See especially (Barnett, 2014) and (Barnett, 2015).…”

Memory is a modeling system

“…Given the wide variety of views on testimony, this theory of memory could work in a wide variety of ways. For simplicity, I will assume the following view of testimony, which Barnett () calls the naive view: “when a source of testimony tells you that p , what you learn first is not p itself but instead merely the fact that the source says that p ’. Barnett goes on to qualify that this is an internalist view in that it depends on your justification in believing that your source is reliable, rather than the source actually being reliable, but I will stay neutral on this point and allow either version to count as the memory‐as‐testimony view.…”