Memory is a modeling system

Abstract

This paper aims to reconfigure the place of memory in epistemology. I start by rethinking the problem that memory systems solve; rather than merely functioning to store information, I argue that the core function of any memory system is to support accurate and relevant retrieval. This way of specifying the function of memory has consequences for which structures and mechanisms make up a memory system. In brief, memory systems are modeling systems. This means that they generate, update and manage a series of overlapping, simplified, relational representations that map out features of the world. Succeeding at building and maintaining models requires the kind of active knowledge generation traditionally associated only with deliberative reasoning.

The repair shop of memory

“…Encoding is the process in which there is an initial exposure to and learning of information; storage occurs when information is maintained over time; and retrieval is the ability to access or recall information. Of course, this tripartite model is complicated somewhat by processes of consolidation and reconsolidation, questions of how in fact memories are integrated and stored for later retrieval (Andonovski 2021;Aronowitz 2019), and theories that recognise the constructive nature of remembering and the importance of retrieval over other stages of the memory process (Addis 2020;Michaelian 2016). Nonetheless, the model is still widely accepted.…”

A planning theory of belief

“…To this, our response is that many models of memory already include inference‐like features (e.g. De Brigard (2014), Aronowitz (2019)). Perhaps softening this distinction is actually a positive move towards a more complete picture of memory.…”

(In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway?

“…It is now often suggested that we ought to reject this sort of claim about ‘the’ ‘function’ of ‘memory’. Not because memory does not involve preservation (Aronowitz 2019), or because it in no sense has functions (Schwarz 2020), or because there is no cohesive faculty picked out by ‘memory’ (Andonovski 2021), but rather because consolidation, reconsolidation, semanticization, and other such dynamic processes are all part of memory itself, and one of the crucial things these processes do is transform the content(s) of whatever vehicles are characteristically retrieved in remembering (De Brigard 2014). According to this (apparently) anti‐preservationist line of thinking, one should not a priori conclude that those processes are not really part of memory per se —and that the retrieval of their products does not constitute remembering proper —simply because they are not purely preservative in character.…”