Is Lewis a Meinongian?

Linsky, Bernard; Zalta, Edward N.

doi:10.1080/00048409112344871

Cited by 21 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In the later extension, the truth-value assignments are contextualized to possible worlds, and range over possible objects in those worlds. 10 On the issue of Lewis's relation to Meinong, see Linsky and Zalta (1991). 11 'Everything which is the case, is the case with regard to or concerning something else and those objects about which an objective is, may be called material' (Findlay 1933.…”

Section: Paul Reddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hegel’s Treatment of Predication Considered in the Light of a Logic for the Actual World

Redding¹

2018

Hegel Bulletin

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One prominent feature of analytic metaphysics in the second half of the twentieth century was the revival of metaphysical debate over modality, and in this paper I suggest that a particular position that emerged within this debate, ‘modal actualism’, bears a striking resemblance to the way that Hegel discusses modal notions in the final chapter of Book 2 of the Science of Logic, ‘Wirklichkeit’ or ‘Actuality’. Modal actualists opposed David Lewis’s counter-intuitive claims about the existence of alternate possible worlds, and aimed to reconcile the reality of alternate possibilities with the common-sense idea of the actual world as all there is. Like Hegel in the chapter ‘Actuality’, they thus argue that possible alternatives to the actual world must, somehow, exist within the actual world. Here I approach these issues via the ideas of John N. Findlay who, in the 1950s, had attempted to reintroduce Hegel into an Anglophone philosophical culture, but who also influenced the later development of modal actualism via his influence on the modal logician, Arthur Prior. Like certain actualists, Findlay distinguished between two modes of predication in order to distinguish, but relate, judgements about the actual from those about the possible. This predicative dualism is strikingly similar to the way Hegel distinguishes two types of predication in his treatment of judgement in Book 3 of the Science of Logic. Reading Hegel’s dualistic account of judgement structure against this background enables us to see how it was meant to provide a logical framework for the ‘actualist’ metaphysics he earlier sketched in the chapter, ‘Actuality’.

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Section: Paul Reddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hegel’s Treatment of Predication Considered in the Light of a Logic for the Actual World

Redding¹

2018

Hegel Bulletin

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“…Every thing that is a part of the world at least once, exists (necessarily). A thing that does not exist has a multiplicity of zero (Linsky and Zalta 1991). Things with the same multiplicity are symmetric.…”

Section: Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Argument for a Self-Explanatory, Benevolent Metaphysics

Blondé¹

2015

Symposion

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In this paper, a metaphysics is proposed that includes everything that can be represented by a well-founded multiset. It is shown that this metaphysics, apart from being self-explanatory, is also benevolent. Paradoxically, it turns out that the probability that we were born in another life than our own is zero. More insights are gained by inducing properties from a metaphysics that is not self-explanatory. In particular, digital metaphysics is analyzed, which claims that only computable things exist. First of all, it is shown that digital metaphysics contradicts itself by leading to the conclusion that the shortest computer program that computes the world is infinitely long. This means that the Church-Turing conjecture must be false. Secondly, the applicability of Occam's razor is explained by evolution: in an evolving physics it can appear at each moment as if the world is caused by only finitely many things. Thirdly and most importantly, this metaphysics is benevolent in the sense that it organizes itself to fulfill the deepest wishes of its observers. Fourthly, universal computers with an infinite memory capacity cannot be built in the world. And finally, all the properties of the world, both good and bad, can be explained by evolutionary conservation.

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“…See Plantinga : § vii.6 for a critique of Lewis (: 86; 1986: 3), and Linsky & Zalta for an insightful analysis of how Lewis's theory relates to Meinong's. The issue is explored thoroughly in Menzel .…”

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confidence: 99%

The Semantics of Actuality Terms: Indexical vs. Descriptive Theories

Davis

2013

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Is Lewis a Meinongian?

Cited by 21 publications

References 9 publications

Hegel’s Treatment of Predication Considered in the Light of a Logic for the Actual World

Hegel’s Treatment of Predication Considered in the Light of a Logic for the Actual World

An Evolutionary Argument for a Self-Explanatory, Benevolent Metaphysics

The Semantics of Actuality Terms: Indexical vs. Descriptive Theories

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