Is it better to be moral than smart? The effects of morality and competence norms on the decision to work at group status improvement.

Abstract

Three studies examined strategies of status improvement in experimentally created (Study 1 and 2) and pre-existing (Study 3) low-status groups. Theory and prior research suggested that an in-group norm that established a particular strategy of status improvement as moral (rather than competent) would have a greater effect on individuals' decision to work at this strategy. Both Study 1 and 2 found that morality norms had a greater impact than competence norms on individuals' decision to work at group (rather than individual) status improvement. In both Study 1 and 2 participants also needed less time to decide on a strategy of status improvement when it is was encouraged by a morality norm rather than a competence norm. Study 3 used a pre-existing low status group (i.e., Southern Italians) to further confirm that morality norms have a greater effect on the decision to work at a group status improvement than do competence norms. Results are discussed in terms of social influence and identity management strategies.Morality, competence, and status improvement 3Is it better to be moral than smart? The effects of morality and competence norms on the decision to work at group status improvement As members of groups, people are faced with the dilemma of working to improve their individual status or working to improve the status of their group as a whole. This dilemma is particularly salient for members of low-status groups who are more concerned about improving their status than are members of high-status groups (Branscombe &

Looking for honesty: The primary role of morality (vs. sociability and competence) in information gathering

“…In a different way, people might be motivated to accurately verify the ingroup member's morality because the presence of an immoral affiliate within their own group is detrimental for the group as a whole. Indeed, an immoral member or someone disregarding the norms, is not functional to the goal's achievement, to the maximization of group benefits (De Waal, 1996;Leach et al, 2007), nor to the maintenance of a positive ingroup image (see Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; see also Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008). Future studies should explore these argumentations considering a wide range of intergroup contexts.…”

Sharing Moral Values: Anticipated Ingroup Respect as a Determinant of Adherence to Morality-Based (but Not Competence-Based) Group Norms

“…First, this is the case because -as argued above -competence differences are generally considered less problematic than differences in moral values. Second, people are quite aware of how others perceive their moral behavior, and are less likely to consider how others regard their competence (Wojciszke, 1994), regardless of their status in society (Ellemers et al, 2008). Indeed, ingroup respect based on superior competence had relatively little impact on the tendency to see the self as a good group member (Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2005).…”

“…Previous research in which low status vs. high status groups were compared established that group status does not affect the perceived importance of morality over competence (Ellemers et al, 2008;Leach et al, 2007).…”

When do circumstances excuse? Moral prejudices and beliefs about the true self drive preferences for agency-minimizing explanations

“…The study was replicated in Malaysia with Malay and Chinese subjects (Hewstone & Ward, 1985). If the tendency of ingroup members to regard themselves as, on average, morally better than out-group members (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008;Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007;Levine & Campbell, 1972;although, cf., De Freitas & Cikara, 2018) extends to assessments of their true selves, the mismatch hypothesis appears to predict the patterning of intergroup explanatory preferences. (Note that the model does not assume all agents are represented as maximally or equally virtuous.…”