Is God just a big person? Children's conceptions of God across cultures and religious traditions

Abstract

The present research examines the influence of intuitive cognitive domain and religion on the God concepts of children growing up in religious traditions that present God in ways varying from abstract to concrete. In Study 1, we compared children from a Latter-Day Saints (LDS) background with those from mainstream Christian (MC) backgrounds in the United States. In contrast to MC theology that holds that God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and disembodied, LDS theology depicts God as embodied. In Study 1, 3- to 7-year-olds from LDS and MC backgrounds were asked about supernatural mental and immaterial attributes of God, a ghost, a dad, and a bug. In Study 2, children ages 3-7 from Muslim and Catholic backgrounds in Indonesia were presented with a variant of Study 1. Taken together, the two studies examine the God concepts of children raised in three different religious traditions with God concepts that range from highly abstract to concrete. Overall, we find that the youngest children, regardless of religion, distinguish God from humans and hold similar ideas of God, attributing more supernatural psychological than physical properties. Older children's conceptions of God are more in line with the theological notions of their traditions. The results suggest that children are not simply anthropomorphic in their God concepts, but early on understand supernatural agents as having special mental properties and they continue to learn about differences between agents, influenced by their religious traditions. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject Research on children's God concepts has established that children begin to distinguish the mind of God from that of humans by around age 4-5. The main debate in the field is whether children start out thinking about God in anthropomorphic terms or whether they start out with an undifferentiated idea of agents' minds as all having access to knowledge. Research on children's understanding of immortality has demonstrated that around the same age that children begin differentiating God's mind from human minds, they also differentiate between the two in terms of life-cycle attributes, attributing immortality to God, but not to humans. What does this study add? The present research contributes to the field by examining the God concepts of children from different religious backgrounds. These religious backgrounds have theologies with God concepts that range from physically concrete (Latter-Day Saints or Mormonism) to highly abstract (Islam). We also include Christian samples for comparison. The present research examines children's attributions to different supernatural agents including God, but also a ghost and an angel. The present studies look at children's attribution of not only supernatural mental attributions, but also the supernatural physical attributions of immateriality and omnipresence that have been understudied.

Sorting through, and sorting out, anthropomorphism in CSR

“…This claim is the theoretical interpretation of numerous studies by CSR researchers in which participants show a significant bias for attributing epistemic, emotional, and desirous psychological properties to the afterliving deceased over biological, psychobiological, and perceptual properties (Astuti and Har is, 2008;Bek and Lock, 2011;Bering, 2002;Gomes et al, 2016;Gray et al, 2011;Huang et al, 2013;Lane et al, 2016;Sebe ény and Emmons, 2017;Watson-Jones et al, 2017). Likewise, this bias is demonstrated in experimental studies of the fo k's representation of gods and interpreted by researchers as evidence of intuitive fo k mind-body dualism, even though the who ly immaterial, independent minds attributed to the supernatural agents in these studies are not ecifica ly human-like (Haslam et al, 2008;Nyhof and Johnson, 2017;Shaman et al, 2018;Shtulman, 2008;Shtulman and Lindeman, 2016).…”

“…Experimental studies conducted in CSR examining how the fo k anthropomorphizes supernatural agents by representing them with human-like perceptual abilities have proven to be a mixed bag. Whereas participants are recorded re ularly attributing visual and auditory perception to supernatural agents, olfactory, ta ile, and ustatory senses are far less frequently attributed to them (Bek and Lock, 2011;Bering, 2002;Nyhof and Johnson, 2017;Shtulman, 2008;Shtulman and Lindeman, 2016;Watson-Jones et al, 2017) save when the participants are imagining themselves as surviving their own deaths in an afterlife (Pereira et al, 2012). This may, however, be an artifact of how the perceptual questions are asked (Hodge, 2012;Lane et al, 2016).…”

Sorting Through, and Sorting Out, Anthropomorphism in CSR

“…This claim is the theoretical interpretation of numerous studies by CSR researchers in which participants show a significant bias for attributing epistemic, emotional, and desirous psychological properties to the afterliving deceased over biological, psychobiological, and perceptual properties (Astuti & Harris, 2008;Bek & Lock, 2011;Bering, 2002;Gomes, Parrott, & Shepherd, 2016;Gray et al, 2011;Huang et al, 2013;Lane et al, 2016;Sebestény & Emmons, 2017;Watson-Jones et al, 2017). Likewise, this bias is demonstrated in experimental studies of the folk's representation of gods and interpreted by researchers as evidence of intuitive folk mind-body dualism, even though the wholly immaterial, independent minds attributed to the supernatural agents in these studies are not specifically human-like (Haslam et al, 2008;Nyhof & Johnson, 2017;Shaman et al, 2018;Shtulman, 2008;Shtulman & Lindeman, 2016).…”

“…Experimental studies conducted in CSR examining how the folk anthropomorphizes supernatural agents by representing them with human-like perceptual abilities have proven to be a mixed bag. Whereas participants are recorded regularly attributing visual and auditory perception to supernatural agents, olfactory, tactile, and gustatory senses are far less frequently attributed to them (Bek & Lock, 2011;Bering, 2002;Bering, Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005;Nyhof & Johnson, 2017;Shtulman, 2008;Shtulman & Lindeman, 2016;Watson-Jones, Busch, Harris, & Legare, 2017) save when the participants are imagining themselves as surviving their own deaths in an afterlife (Pereira, Faísca, & Sá-Saraiva, 2012). This may, however, be an artifact of how the perceptual questions are asked (Hodge, 2012;Lane, Liqi, Evans, & Wellman, 2016).…”

O conceito Deus em crianças cristãs: o antropomorfismo e o uso das imagens religiosas

“…Teologia/Doutrina raciocinando acerca de Deus de maneira independente do conceito de humano (Nyhof & Johnson, 2017).…”