Sorting through, and sorting out, anthropomorphism in CSR

Abstract

This article reviews and discusses the various ways by which researchers in the cognitive science of religion have empirically demonstrated that neurotypical humans (a.k.a., the folk) represent supernatural agents through the cognitive analogical processes of anthropomorphism. These include attributing a human-like mind, human-like physical and mental limitations, and human-like sociability. Additionally, the article points to several problematic issues that CSR must needs address, such as how to better demarcate when the folk are anthropomorphizing versus simply attributing agency, and how CSR's insistence that the folk represents supernatural agents as disembodied minds places it at odds with the overwhelming and devastating evidence to the contrary.

Beyond Buddhism and animism: A psychometric test of the structure of Burmese Theravada Buddhism

“…Why should a living Buddha be more cognitively optimal than a non-available one? One potential explanation is that this is a more strongly anthropomorphic conception of the Buddha, in that it allows for the possibility of social interaction with him [75,76], a property which has been claimed to motivate anthropomorphism more generally [77]. This being the case, in order to enforce the counterintuitive notion of a non-agentive Buddha, doctrinal Theravada would have to rely on the strength of religious authorities and institutions dedicated to countering a takeover by more minimally counterintuitive ideas [78,79].…”