Is Epistemic Agency Possible?

Abstract

There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic agents, which is that the structure of reasons for epistemic attitudes differs fundamentally from the structure of reasons for actions. The main differences are that we cannot act for the wrong reasons although we can believe for the wrong reasons, and that reasons for beliefs are exclusive in a sense in which our reasons for actions are not. Epistemic agency is possible in the weak sense that we can be active, but not in the strong one in which we could have some elbow room for our epistemic reasons in reasoning leading to beliefs and other epistemic states.

Introduction: Examined Live – An Epistemological Exchange Between Philosophy and Cultural Psychology on Reflection

“…The reflexive character of human understanding implies the question of the normativity of agency. We turn our attention towards ourselves, our own internal states, and we become self-conscious of our own intentions, desires, beliefs, attitudes and of the way those states have been formed (Nagel 1996, p. 200 However, according to other philosophers, the supposed capability of accessing, controlling, evaluating and deciding about one's own beliefs; as well as the capability of producing new beliefs based exclusively on reflection; and the capability of acting on the basis of reflexive self-consciousness, is a mere illusion, or something at least very limited (Goldman 1979;Tiberius 2008;Kahneman 2011;Kornblith 2012;Engel 2013;Hieronymi 2014;Proust 2013;Doris 2015). There is an intense debate around the disagreement about the place and value of reflection in the cognitive and moral human economy.…”

O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?

“…Em uma tentativa de oferecer uma taxionomia do que a literatura apresenta agora como agência epistêmica, Engel (2013) sumariza essa versão plena ou madura de agência (full-blown agency, na definição de Michael Bratman), nas seguintes condições mínimas: um agente faz φ se e somente se: i) ele tem uma razão para φ que é constituída pelo menos por uma intenção; ii) a razão e a intenção causam um movimento corporal de modo apropriado e iii) ele poderia ter agido diferentemente (possibilidades alternativas). 4 A despeito dos problemas que o modelo acima pode apresentarhá vários que o próprio Engel reconhece 5 -, penso que ele reflete adequadamente o que em geral se considera serem a concepção e a teoria padrão da ação.…”