Is Co-Decision Good for the Environment? an Analysis of the European Parliament's Green Credentials

Burns, Charlotte; Carter, Neil

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00782.x

Cited by 42 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…This reputation has been earned mainly due to the activities of its influential Environment, Public Health and Food Safety committee (ENVI). However, more recent studies (Smith, 2008;Burns and Carter, 2010) suggest that the EP's green credentials have decreased with an increase in the EP's legislative powers. Perhaps this can be taken as a sign of the EP's interest groups politics starting to look more 'normal' in which common assumptions in the interest group literature -for concentrated interests to prevail over diffuse interests -find resonance in the EP.…”

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confidence: 94%

Is the European Parliament still a policy champion for environmental interests?

Rasmussen

2012

Int Groups Adv

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Executive Summary A wide range of interest groups target the European Parliament (EP) and MEPs have a reputation for being particularly open to diffuse interests, who, due to their limited resources, use 'friendly' MEPs to put pressure on the European Commission and the Council. The notion of the EP representing diffuse as opposed to concentrated interests, conflicts with the broader political science literature on interest groups that dwells on business bias. The general expectation in the literature is for concentrated groups (such as the automobile industry) to prevail over diffuse interests (such as environmental interests). This article considers whether this is a case of conventional wisdom confirmed -or a sectoral exceptionalism. In fact, there are good reasons to doubt the EP's reputation as a policy champion for diffuse interests. Much of our current knowledge about the EP's interest group politics stems from a time when the EP's legislative powers were more limited. Within a relatively short time span the EP has evolved from a token 'multi-lingual talking shop' to, what some researchers have named, one of the most powerful elected legislatures in the world. Arguably, as the powers of the EP have increased, so has attention from interest groups. Few interest groups now dare leave the parliamentary arena to their opponents, and most interest groups adopt a belt-and-braces approach in which 'the institutional trio' (the European Commission, Council and the EP) is lobbied throughout the policy process. The increased powers raises the question of whether the EP still privileges diffuse interests or simply reinforces the advantages of concentrated interests. This question is addressed in this article by examining one recent regulation: Regulation 2011/510/EC on the reduction of CO 2 emissions from light commercial vehicles. Based on processtracing of EU documents and lobbying letters, and interviews with MEPs, EP officials and interest groups, this article shows that the EP is no longer an environmental champion, but instead appears to be more of an environmental pragmatist. Three factors contribute to this change: asymmetric lobbying from industry, a change in the EP's negotiating strategy and increased cooperation between the EP committees. These changes have reduced the privileged position once held by diffuse interests, and provided concentrated interests with r

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confidence: 94%

Is the European Parliament still a policy champion for environmental interests?

Rasmussen

2012

Int Groups Adv

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“…Some have pointed to the enduring, even possibly growing, role of the 'national factor' inside and around the EP (Whitaker 2011;Panke 2012). Others have found evidence that the EP is waivering in its longstanding commitment to championing diffuse interests (Burns and Carter 2010;Burns, Carter, and Worsfold 2012;Rasmussen 2012). Especially, the 4 development of legislative trilogues has fuelled renewed controversy.…”

Section: The Puzzle Of the Ep As A 'Normal' Parliamentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The European Parliament as a developing legislature: coming of age in trilogues?

Roederer-Rynning

Greenwood

2016

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…Amongst others, the protection of groundwater, the emission of various hazardous substances, and the cost-recovery of water services proved to be sore points [16,17]. The relationship between the Commission and the Parliament, in contrast, is traditionally very close in the field of environment [28], and both actors largely supported each other during the WFD negotiations.…”

Section: Negotiating the Wfd: Opposing Viewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Undermining European Environmental Policy Goals? The EU Water Framework Directive and the Politics of Exemptions

Boeuf

Fritsch

Martín-Ortega

2016

Water

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Abstract:The Water Framework Directive (WFD) is the core legislative instrument in the European Union for the protection of water resources. Adopted in 2000, its objectives were to achieve "good status" for water bodies by 2015 and prevent any further deterioration. However, the European Commission and some stakeholders are rather dissatisfied with the implementation of the Directive so far, in particular with the use of exemptions to the environmental objectives. Exemptions are of paramount importance: they may constitute a significant obstacle to the achievement of the WFD's objectives as they enable member states to lower the ambition of the Directive and to delay the achievement of good status, thereby undermining the environmental goal of the WFD. Critical voices observe an excessive reliance on exemptions, poor justifications, and great variations in their use. Based on an analysis of 120 policy documents and 15 semi-structured interviews, this article provides explanations for the politics of exemptions in EU water management. It shows that different viewpoints and interpretations on the WFD's objectives and exemptions were already present in the negotiation phase of the Directive, but remained undefined on purpose. Moreover, dysfunctional decision-making procedures in the Common Implementation Strategy and the lack of political support in WFD implementation were significant obstacles to an agreement on this important issue. Finally, decisions on WFD implementation in member states were often driven by pragmatism. The article explains how the negotiations of the WFD and the EU-level discussion on the implementation of the Directive undermined environmental goals in EU governance; its findings are also relevant for policy fields other than water.

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Is Co-Decision Good for the Environment? an Analysis of the European Parliament's Green Credentials

Cited by 42 publications

References 33 publications

Is the European Parliament still a policy champion for environmental interests?

Is the European Parliament still a policy champion for environmental interests?

The European Parliament as a developing legislature: coming of age in trilogues?

Undermining European Environmental Policy Goals? The EU Water Framework Directive and the Politics of Exemptions

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