Is China eroding the bargaining power of traditional donors in Africa?

Development co‐operation and the partnership–ownership nexus: Lessons from the Canada–Ghana experience

“…While countries and their governments remain key players, the numbers of both donors and recipents (as well as a significant sub‐set that are both donors and recipients) has grown sharply, including a growing number of “aid providers” that fall outside the familiar confines of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD‐DAC). The motivations and impact of these new aid providers is increasingly significant, but still only superficially understood in empirical terms (Luijkx & Benn, 2017; Gulrajani & Swiss, 2019; Swedlund, 2017b.) Moreover, traditional bilateral development agencies are enjoined to embrace an array of “innovative” multi‐stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) involving not only civil society organizations (CSOs) of widely varying size, specialization and provenance, but also corporate and related philanthropic actors, universities, research institutions, etc.…”

Donors in transition and the future of development cooperation: What do the data from Brazil, India, China, and South Africa reveal?

“…To date, only a handful of studies empirically examine the impact Southern providers may be having on DAC donors' activities and policies (Kragelund, 2015;Swedlund, 2017). And yet the rise of the BRICS and other non-DAC providers can be both an opportunity and a challenge for their DAC counterparts.…”

“…It has not escaped the attention of the DAC that the current definition of ODA, as well as certain governing principles to which all of its members subscribe, makes its flows uncompetitive in many aid-receiving countries (Chaturvedi, 2016). In recipient countries that are not completely aid dependent, DAC donors are likely to be directly competing for political leverage and market access with non-DAC members (Swedlund, 2017). There are now real concerns that non-DAC actors may be diluting standards among DAC donors by shifting aid allocation patterns and fragmenting the global aid system (Kragelund, 2015;Mawdsley, 2015).…”

“…Non-DAC donors potentially gain commercial advantages through the modalities of their development spending that DAC donors simply cannot access (Asmus et al, 2017). For example, development finance flows are often tied to exports and strongly linked to trade and investment interests (Fuchs, Dreher, & Nunnenkamp, 2014;Gulrajani & Swiss, 2018;Swedlund, 2017;Woods, 2008). 5 Non-DAC providers are not hindered by the obligations within a specific definition of development assistance (i.e., ODA) or any other widely accepted quantitative metric of development cooperation, rendering both the comparative size and terms of their development spending illegible.…”

“…As aid flows become a smaller size of the economy relative to other financial flows in MICs, aid to growth-enhancing sectors offers the prospect of enhancing trade and investment opportunities for its providers (Mawdsley, 2019;Swedlund, 2017). In contrast, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) championed aid to social sectors with its indirect consequences for growth, mainly through effects on human capital.…”