Iran, the GCC and the Implications of the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry versus Engagement

Bahi, Riham

doi:10.1080/03932729.2017.1306395

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…As mentioned, countries such as Oman and Qatar have relatively positive relations with Iran. The two countries also share similar perceptions and adopt a relatively softer stance than the UAE regarding Iran's aggressiveness (Bahi, 2017).…”

Section: So Why Did the Uae Normalize Relations With Israel?mentioning

confidence: 95%

United Arab Emirates - Israel Rapprochement: A Rational Choice of Emiratis

Triantama

2023

Journal of International Studies

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When the UAE and Israel decided to normalize diplomatic relations, later known as the Abraham Accords, the decision sparked globalcontroversy, especially from Islamic countries. One of the countries which vehemently condemned this deal was Iran. Iran viewed theagreement as a form of betrayal of the Palestinian struggle. However, based on an analysis using the Balance of Threat theory, this article concluded that Iran had in fact caused UAE’s decision to normalize relations. It was because Iran, through its superiority of aggregate power, geographical proximity, and offensive policy character, presented a serious threat to the security of the UAE. Thus, the normalization of relations with Israel was the best and rational choice for the UAE in dealing with the Iranian threat. Through this normalization, the UAE has gained a new partner to jointly counterbalance Iran’s power and help in efforts to strengthen its own defense forces.

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Section: So Why Did the Uae Normalize Relations With Israel?mentioning

confidence: 95%

United Arab Emirates - Israel Rapprochement: A Rational Choice of Emiratis

Triantama

2023

Journal of International Studies

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“…Selanjutnya kategori kedua pada kajian terdahulu membahas tentang konflik kawasan yang menjabarkan bagaimana sejarah terjadinya konflik di kawasan dan konsekuensi yang dihadapi negara-negara GCC (Khalidi, 1991) dan juga membahas konflik yang terjadi antara negara-negara anggota GCC dengan Iran (Shayan, 2013;Bahi, 2017;Pradhan, 2011…”

Section: Pendahuluanunclassified

Kegagalan Diplomasi Koersif Arab Saudi terhadap Qatar

Febriandi¹

2019

IJIR

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Saudi Arabia along with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt suddenly cut off their diplomatic relations with Qatar. Allegations of Qatar's active participation in supporting terrorism have led to this decision. Saudi Arabia and allies carried out a blockade of land, sea and air and then submitted 13 conditions to Qatar. Qatar firmly refused to comply with Saudi’s demands. This paper will discuss the factors of failure of coercive diplomacy carried out by Saudi Arabia and allies against Qatar. As for supporting the author's analysis, this paper will use the theory of coercive diplomacy by Alexander L. George.

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“…93 The Ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum stated, after the ad interim nuclear agreement in November 2013 that: "Iran is our neighbor and we don't want any problem… everybody will benefit." 94 Dubai, home to a large community of Iranian expatriates and businesses, perceived the reintegration of Tehran in the international economic community as an opportunity for economic development rather than a threat. Abu Dhabi, instead, closely aligned with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain's view of Iran as a predatory state and a threat to regional stability, a position reinforced by the declaration of the UAE's Ambassador to the United States.…”

Section: (Un)common Perceptions About Iranmentioning

confidence: 99%

The intra-GCC crises: mapping GCC fragmentation after 2011

Bianco¹,

Stansfield²

2018

International Affairs

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If shared security perceptions were the foundation of the GCC, 2011 might be analysed as the watershed year in which the GCC begun to fragment from within, as then the divergences between the countries' security perceptions became markedly exacerbated. It is commonly held that the threat posed to their security by Iranian intent and, at times, actions forced the countries of the GCC to be more aligned. However, the opposite seems to be the case, with both the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises being manifestations of conflicting security perceptions formed across the GCC countries in and since 2011. Through an in-depth analysis of the events and of the subsequent reaction of the GCC governments in terms of discourse and foreign policy, we can distinguish between three different categories of conceptualization. While the governments of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE perceived domestic protests as an intermestic threat -triggered by the intersection between the international and domestic levels -the leaders of Oman and Kuwait conceptualised their protests as a manageable domestic insecurity, rather than full-fledged externally orchestrated events, arguably because they did not perceive a direct danger to their stability and legitimacy. Finally it can be argued that the government of Qatar did not see any real danger in the protests but instead view them as an opportunity to expand Doha's regional influence, arguably at Riyadh's expense. Unpacking what are the fundamental factors shaping such perceptions today would be the key to finding the appropriate framework for analysing GCC security in the future.In the summer of 2017, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), widely regarded as one of the most stable regional organizations of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, was hit by the gravest crisis since its formation. 1 The crisis, whose prelude was arguably in 2014 and that is still unfolding in the winter of 2017, threatened the fate of the six-countries-bloc and, in that, was markedly different from recurring skirmishes of the past. The other main difference between past and present, would be that the crises of 2017 and 2014 have happened in the context of a reshuffled region, shook in 2011 by a multitude of events that put into question the political, economic and security dynamics at the domestic and regional levels, contemporarily. This article rests on the premise that the events of 2011 represented a watershed moment in the history of the GCC itself and strives to highlight the direct connections between that moment and the crises of 2014 and 2017. It argues that the recent crises have shown unequivocally how threat perceptions are increasingly divergent at the level of the GCC governments and that, while some divergences have clearly existed for decades, they surfaced predominantly in the context of the popular uprisings of 2011. It further argues that such divergences are rooted in tangible domestic factors -such as deep cleavages in the national fabrics, or dysfunctional socio-economic dynamics -as...

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Iran, the GCC and the Implications of the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry versus Engagement

Cited by 9 publications

References 7 publications

United Arab Emirates - Israel Rapprochement: A Rational Choice of Emiratis

United Arab Emirates - Israel Rapprochement: A Rational Choice of Emiratis

Kegagalan Diplomasi Koersif Arab Saudi terhadap Qatar

The intra-GCC crises: mapping GCC fragmentation after 2011

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