The intra-GCC crises: mapping GCC fragmentation after 2011

Abstract

If shared security perceptions were the foundation of the GCC, 2011 might be analysed as the watershed year in which the GCC begun to fragment from within, as then the divergences between the countries' security perceptions became markedly exacerbated. It is commonly held that the threat posed to their security by Iranian intent and, at times, actions forced the countries of the GCC to be more aligned. However, the opposite seems to be the case, with both the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises being manifestations of conflicting security perceptions formed across the GCC countries in and since 2011. Through an in-depth analysis of the events and of the subsequent reaction of the GCC governments in terms of discourse and foreign policy, we can distinguish between three different categories of conceptualization. While the governments of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE perceived domestic protests as an intermestic threat -triggered by the intersection between the international and domestic levels -the leaders of Oman and Kuwait conceptualised their protests as a manageable domestic insecurity, rather than full-fledged externally orchestrated events, arguably because they did not perceive a direct danger to their stability and legitimacy. Finally it can be argued that the government of Qatar did not see any real danger in the protests but instead view them as an opportunity to expand Doha's regional influence, arguably at Riyadh's expense. Unpacking what are the fundamental factors shaping such perceptions today would be the key to finding the appropriate framework for analysing GCC security in the future.In the summer of 2017, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), widely regarded as one of the most stable regional organizations of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, was hit by the gravest crisis since its formation. 1 The crisis, whose prelude was arguably in 2014 and that is still unfolding in the winter of 2017, threatened the fate of the six-countries-bloc and, in that, was markedly different from recurring skirmishes of the past. The other main difference between past and present, would be that the crises of 2017 and 2014 have happened in the context of a reshuffled region, shook in 2011 by a multitude of events that put into question the political, economic and security dynamics at the domestic and regional levels, contemporarily. This article rests on the premise that the events of 2011 represented a watershed moment in the history of the GCC itself and strives to highlight the direct connections between that moment and the crises of 2014 and 2017. It argues that the recent crises have shown unequivocally how threat perceptions are increasingly divergent at the level of the GCC governments and that, while some divergences have clearly existed for decades, they surfaced predominantly in the context of the popular uprisings of 2011. It further argues that such divergences are rooted in tangible domestic factors -such as deep cleavages in the national fabrics, or dysfunctional socio-economic dynamics -as...

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