IPR Law Protection and Enforcement and the Effect on Horizontal Productivity Spillovers from Inward FDI to Domestic Firms: A Meta-analysis

Abstract

We study the role of the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) law protection and enforcement in influencing horizontal productivity spillovers from inward FDI to domestic firms in host countries. While most WTO countries adopted strong IPR legislation due to exogenous pressure resulting from the signing of the Trade-Related Aspects of IPR (TRIPS) agreement, public IPR enforcement strength continues to vary significantly between countries. We meta-analyse 49 studies and find that public IPR enforcement strength has a direct positive effect on horizontal productivity spillovers from inward FDI to domestic firms and a negative moderating effect on the relationship between IPR law protection strength and horizontal productivity spillovers from inward FDI to domestic firms.

The impact of trust on intellectual property right protection: a cross-national study

“…The moderation of formal institutions on the link between trust and IPR According to Beck et al (2008) and Cruz-Garc ıa and Peir o-Palomino (2019), formal institutions are measured by economic-judicial institutions, including rules of law, regulatory protections or legal policies that established by the states. Previous studies have empirically validated the clear relationship between rules of law and property right protection (Chang et al, 2017;Christopoulou et al, 2021;Papageorgiadis and Sofka, 2020;Peng et al, 2017). Based on these studies, it is acknowledged that the higher level of law protection of a country, the lower its rate of software piracy.…”

Contract Types, Institutional Distance and Operational Performance: Evidence from Global Trade Flows in the LNG Industry

“…The explanation of the aforementioned phenomenon can be facilitated by the instrumentation of another body of literature which has acknowledged the important role institutions -formal and informal -play in constraining acceptable actions in economic exchanges (Christopoulou et al, 2021;North, 1990;Peng, Lee and Wang, 2005;White et al, 2013) and in supporting contract enforcement (Greif, 2005). The preference for long-term contracts over shorter-term solutions can be explained by the relative strength or weakness of buyer and supplier home country institutional regimes.…”

“…The explanation of the aforementioned phenomenon can be facilitated by the instrumentation of another body of literature which has acknowledged the important role institutions – formal and informal – play in constraining acceptable actions in economic exchanges (Christopoulou et al. , 2021; North, 1990; Peng, Lee and Wang, 2005; White et al. , 2013) and in supporting contract enforcement (Greif, 2005).…”