Intuitions without concepts lose the game: mindedness in the art of chess

Abstract

To gain insight into human nature philosophers often discuss the inferior performance that results from deficits such as blindsight or amnesia. Less often do they look at superior abilities. A notable exception is Herbert Dreyfus who has developed a theory of expertise according to which expert action generally proceeds automatically and unreflectively. We address one of Dreyfus's primary examples of expertise: chess. At first glance, chess would seem an obvious counterexample to Dreyfus's view since, clearly, chess experts are engaged in deep strategic thought. However, Dreyfus's argument is subtle. He accepts that analysis and deliberation play a role in chess, yet he thinks that all such thought is predicated on intuitive, arational expert perception, and action. We argue that even the so-called "intuitive" aspect of chess is rational through and through.

Defending Dreyfus Against the ‘Expert in X’

“…(Montero and Evans 2011, p. 191) However, if Gauker is correct, then this example is problematic. A similar argument, directed specifically at Montero and Evans (2011), is expressed by Fernand Gobet (2012). Whereas Montero and Evans use the Dragon Sicilian Yugoslav Attack example to illustrate their point that intuition is rational through and through, Gobet says the example ''beautifully illustrates the idea that perception, and hence intuition, precedes conceptualization'' (2012, p. 245).…”

“…4 Although Selinger and Crease's examples suggest the expertise of an 'expert in X' is perceptual, other opponents of Dreyfus' position are more explicit in this regard. Consider Montero and Evans (2011) argument against applying Dreyfus' account to chess.…”

“…Unlike Dreyfus who would claim that Fischer's ability was due to his ''arational intuition'', Montero and Evans claim Fischer's ability was a ''rational process' ' (2011, p. 191). If we were to use Ryle's distinction between know-how and know-that to understand their argument, Montero and Evans (2011) would argue that whereas Dreyfus would regard chess expertise as a matter of know-how, they argue it is a matter of know-that, as expert chess players can articulate and justify their reasons retrospectively and in action. Put this way, we can see that Montero and Evans would likely agree with Selinger and Crease's distinction between an 'expert x' and an 'expert in x', and argue that a chess player is an 'expert in x', as their expertise is definitively propositional.…”

“…As Gobet says, sometimes the reason could be verbalisable, e.g., ''the black king can escape' ' (2012, p. 245), or the reason could be because of a hunch or ''gut feeling'' (2012, p. 245), which are not rational in the sense that Montero and Evans (2011) use the term. Moreover, Gobet says that, in some cases, if we try to articulate our reason, the result is too vague to be useful (Gobet 2012, p. 246).…”

Three Views on Expertise: Philosophical Implications for Rationality, Knowledge, Intuition and Education

“…The aim of this article is to discuss three views of expertise that have something important to say about these philosophical issues. While two of these views come from philosophy (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, , hereafter D&D; Montero and Evans, , hereafter, M&E) and one from psychology (Gobet and Chassy, , hereafter, G&C), they all address similar philosophical questions, albeit with rather different conclusions. The article first briefly reviews the issue of defining and identifying expertise and the philosophical debate around knowing‐how and knowing‐that.…”