Intuitions as Evidence Facilitators

Ramsey, William

doi:10.1111/meta.12351

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…8. If we take such intuitions to count as evidence for or against particular accounts of a concept, then conceptual analysis in the analytic-philosophical tradition is perhaps in some sense “lightly” empirical, though differing views about the evidential status of intuitions have incited a lively debate among philosophers concerning the veracity of just this sort of claim (see, e.g. Clarke, 2013; Climenhaga, 2018; Molyneux, 2014; Ramsay, 2019). …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The trouble with diverse books, part I: on the limits of conceptual analysis for political negotiation in Library & Information Science

Lawrence

2020

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PurposeThe term diverse books is increasingly popular yet persistently nebulous. The purpose of this paper – Part I of II – is to illuminate both that the concept is in need of a unified account and that conceptual analysis, though at first seemingly quite promising, fails as a method for identifying one.Design/methodology/approachThis paper utilizes traditional (or intuitive) conceptual analysis to specify the respective clusters of necessary and sufficient conditions that constitute four broad candidate accounts of diverse books.FindingsThough diverse books is a concept in need of a definition, conceptual analysis is not an appropriate method for adjudicating between the definitions we have on offer. This is because the concept is fundamentally political, serving as a resource for re-shaping collective social arrangements and ways of life. The conceptual problem outlined here requires for its resolution a method that will move us from a descriptive project to an explicitly normative one, wherein we consider what we properly work to achieve with and through the concept in question.Originality/valueThis paper initiates a systematic analytical project aimed at defining diverse books. In illustrating a moment of methodological failure, it paves the way for a critical alternative – namely, Part II's proposal of an analytical intervention in which political concepts are defined partially in terms of their benefits vis-á-vis informational justice.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The trouble with diverse books, part I: on the limits of conceptual analysis for political negotiation in Library & Information Science

Lawrence

2020

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“…Alternatively, gut instinct or intuition regards neoliberalism's supposed negative effects may be what scholars seek to convey. Instinct in the guise of ‘commonsense’ or ‘just being the case’ has, some epistemic conservatives believe, a claim to our attention (Fumerton, ), and it is proposed that intuition can stand as evidence in certain circumstances (Climenhaga, ; Maguire, ; Ramsey, ).…”

Section: Rebuttals and Closurementioning

confidence: 99%

Neoliberalism and neoliberals: What are we talking about?

Lipscomb

2019

Nursing Inquiry

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The terms neoliberalism and neoliberal play a variety of roles ranging from major to trivial in the papers they appear in. Both phrases carry pejorative connotations in nurse writing. Yet irrespective of the role assumed in argument, readers are rarely provided with enough information to determine what the descriptors mean in a substantive or concrete sense. It is proposed that scholars who use these terms in their work should consider expressing themselves more carefully than often occurs at present. Virtue signalling in academic writing should, absent critical argument, be discouraged.

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Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!

Mizrahi

2021

Axiomathes

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In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion follows from reasonable premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against philosophical theses used by professional analytic philosophers be public (or transparent) in order to have the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. Since intuitions are not public (or transparent) evidence, it follows that appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments for and/or against philosophical theses because they lack the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers.

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Intuitions as Evidence Facilitators

Cited by 4 publications

References 33 publications

The trouble with diverse books, part I: on the limits of conceptual analysis for political negotiation in Library & Information Science

The trouble with diverse books, part I: on the limits of conceptual analysis for political negotiation in Library & Information Science

Neoliberalism and neoliberals: What are we talking about?

Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!

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