Abstract:Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. Our thesis explains why intuiti… Show more
“…To support this line, traditionalists often point to important dissimilarities between the way basic evidential states like perceptions and memories function, on the one hand, and the role of TEIJs, on the other hand. For example, as Earlenbaugh and Molyneux () note, basic evidential states serve as evidence both for the subject possessing the psychological state and for others who don’t possess the state but accept the testimony of those who do. If you tell me you see some event that I’m not in a position to see, or that you recall an event that I was not around to witness, then, unless I have reason to doubt you, your reported experiences provide me with a reason to believe that these events are real.…”
There is currently an important debate about whether philosophical intuitions are intended as evidence for the theories philosophers promote. On one side are those who argue that philosophers do rely on intuitions as evidence; on the other side are those who deny any such role for philosophical intuitions. This paper argues that both sides of this debate are partially right and partially wrong. Intuitive judgments do not, as psychological states, function as evidence in most well‐known philosophical thought experiments. Philosophers nevertheless strongly depend upon these intuitive judgments. Where both sides go awry is in assuming that the importance of intuitive judgments rests solely upon their role as evidence. We need to distinguish between evidence, as such, from various nonevidential psychological states that are needed for something else to serve as evidence. The paper calls these latter conditions “evidence facilitators” and argues that intuitive judgments belong in this category.
“…To support this line, traditionalists often point to important dissimilarities between the way basic evidential states like perceptions and memories function, on the one hand, and the role of TEIJs, on the other hand. For example, as Earlenbaugh and Molyneux () note, basic evidential states serve as evidence both for the subject possessing the psychological state and for others who don’t possess the state but accept the testimony of those who do. If you tell me you see some event that I’m not in a position to see, or that you recall an event that I was not around to witness, then, unless I have reason to doubt you, your reported experiences provide me with a reason to believe that these events are real.…”
There is currently an important debate about whether philosophical intuitions are intended as evidence for the theories philosophers promote. On one side are those who argue that philosophers do rely on intuitions as evidence; on the other side are those who deny any such role for philosophical intuitions. This paper argues that both sides of this debate are partially right and partially wrong. Intuitive judgments do not, as psychological states, function as evidence in most well‐known philosophical thought experiments. Philosophers nevertheless strongly depend upon these intuitive judgments. Where both sides go awry is in assuming that the importance of intuitive judgments rests solely upon their role as evidence. We need to distinguish between evidence, as such, from various nonevidential psychological states that are needed for something else to serve as evidence. The paper calls these latter conditions “evidence facilitators” and argues that intuitive judgments belong in this category.
“…It is common to take intuitions to be so taken—and it is also this that underlies experimental philosophers' concern with intuitions as evidence—but the matter is not altogether clear cut. Earlenbaugh and Molyneux () have recently argued at length that intuitions are not in fact used as evidence but are instead just inclinations to believe . And in his online review of Ladyman and Ross's Every Thing Must Go (), Cian Dorr () says:Often, saying “Intuitively, P” is no more than a device for committing oneself to P while signaling that one is not going to provide any further arguments for this claim.…”
This article is in three parts. The first discusses trends in philosophy. The second defends reliance on intuitions in philosophy from some doubts that have recently been raised. The third discusses Philip Kitcher's contention that contemporary analytic philosophy does not have its priorities straight. While the three parts are independent, there is a common theme. Each part defends what is regarded as orthodoxy from attacks. Of course there are other reasonable challenges to philosophical methodology. The article's aim is just to respond to some charges that have been made.
“…If, on the other hand, the claim is that the contents of intuitions are treated as evidence even when they are not believed, then the view appears hopeless. Acting only in good faith, nobody could advance p as evidence unless she also believed it (Earlenbaugh and Molyneux ) . In any case, the propositional view is not the view that, so far as I can tell, is assumed by the majority of the participants in the literature.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Or at least put credence in it. In that case, revise the argument to replace “when they are believed” with “when they are believed to some nonzero degree.” See Earlenbaugh and Molyneux .…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other reasons for thinking that intuitions are not simple two‐place relations to propositions are presented in Earlenbaugh and Molyneux .…”
According to orthodox views of philosophical methodology, when philosophers appeal to intuitions, they treat them as evidence for their contents. Call this “descriptive evidentialism.” Descriptive evidentialism is assumed both by those who defend the epistemic status of intuitions and by those, including many experimental philosophers, who criticize it. This article shows, however, that the idea that philosophers treat intuitions as evidence struggles to account for the way philosophers treat intuitions in a variety of philosophical contexts. In particular, it cannot account for philosophers' treatment of a priori intuitions, for nonpropositional uses of intuition, and for philosophers' failure to use intuition to exclude the counterintuitive. The article concludes that alternatives to descriptive evidentialism (some of which are sketched) must be developed, and that much of the recent debate between traditionalists and skeptics from, for example, experimental philosophy is probably based on a false presupposition.
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