Intuitionism and Nihilism

Kaspar, David

doi:10.1007/s11406-017-9930-0

Cited by 3 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…For example, I know that I ought to tell the truth, on this view, since it seems to me that I ought to tell the truth. For more on intuitionism, see Kaspar (2012). 1.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy

Ashton

Mizrahi

2017

Erkenn

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The "received wisdom" in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this "received wisdom." The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic philosophers appeal to intuition. We present empirical and contextual evidence, systematically mined from the JSTOR corpus and HathiTrust's Digital Library, which provide some empirical support for the second rather than the first hypothesis. Our data also suggest that appealing to intuition is a much older philosophical methodology than the "received wisdom" alleges. We then discuss the implications of our findings for the contemporary debate over philosophical methodology.

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“…For example, I know that I ought to tell the truth, on this view, since it seems to me that I ought to tell the truth. For more on intuitionism, see Kaspar (2012). 1.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy

Ashton

Mizrahi

2017

Erkenn

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“…Robert Cowan has his own distinctive approach to moral thought and its objects. I have previously argued that the best moral intuitionism would incorporate the theories of several different intuitionists, and other ethicists [3] (pp. [7][8].…”

Section: A Proposed Rossian Intuitionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The central aim of Cowan's paper is to advance what he calls 'Rossian Conceptualist Intuitionism', the key component of which is his Conceptualism. In his view, it is prima facie preferable to what he calls 'Perceptualism', which he describes as an 'account of self-evidence' [4] (p. 822) (All subsequent Cowan citations are of this article) [3].…”

Section: Replacing Self-evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Rossian Intuitionism without Self-Evidence?

Kaspar

2022

Philosophies

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The first phase of the recent intuitionist revival left untouched Ross’s claim that fundamental moral truths are self-evident. In a recent article, Robert Cowan attempts to explain, in a plausible way, how we know moral truths. The result is that, while the broad framework of Ross’s theory appears to remain in place, the self-evidence of moral truths is thrown into doubt. In this paper, I examine Cowan’s Conceptual Intuitionism. I use his own proposal to show how he arrives at a skeptical position on self-evidence. First, he completely ignores the kind of epistemic appraisal intuitionism has always rested on; second, he is committed to the Reasons View of prima facie duty, rather than to Ross’s Properties View; third, he holds that a commitment to self-evidence often comes with a commitment to metaphysically extravagant entities, which he calls Perceptualism; fourth, he scrutinizes only a part of the contemporary theory of self-evidence, overlooking the strengths of the theory when considered as a whole. Revealing these several points supports the conclusion that Cowan has not provided a viable variety of Rossian Intuitionism.

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“…Some intuitionists (e.g. Kaspar 2012) hold that no 'supreme' principle is needed, but others defend such principles (see e.g. Moore 1903, Sidgwick 1907, and Audi 2004.…”

Section: Dialogue's Rolementioning

confidence: 99%

“…I then show that we can expect such dialogue to generate some moral beliefs that are justified a priori ( §2) and some that are justified by a posteriori moral experience ( §3). 1 Intuitionism has a long history, but its recent supporters include Shafer-Landau (2003), Audi (2004), Huemer (2005), Tropman (2009), Kaspar (2012), andStratton-Lake (2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Intuitionism

Ingram

2020

The Philosophical Quarterly

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According to pluralistic intuitionist theories, some of our moral beliefs are non-inferentially justified, and these beliefs come in both an a priori and an a posteriori variety. In this paper, I present new support for this pluralistic form of intuitionism by examining the deeply social nature of moral inquiry. This is something that intuitionists have tended to neglect. It does play an important role in an intuitionist theory offered by Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau, but whilst they invoke the social nature of moral inquiry in order to argue that ordinary moral intuitions are trustworthy, my argument focuses on what I will call the ‘frontiers’ of moral inquiry. I will show that inclusive and cooperative dialogue is necessary at moral inquiry's frontiers, and that intuitionists can expect such dialogue to result in both a priori and a posteriori moral beliefs.

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Intuitionism and Nihilism

Cited by 3 publications

References 12 publications

Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy

Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy

Rossian Intuitionism without Self-Evidence?

Cooperative Intuitionism

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