Introduction to Combinatorial Auctions

Cramton, Peter; Shoham, Yoav; Steinberg, Richard

doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0001

Cited by 352 publications

(559 citation statements)

References 20 publications

(8 reference statements)

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“…Combinatorial auctions (CAs) generalize traditional market mechanisms by allowing the direct specification of bids over bundles of items (Cramton et al, 2005). For example, by allowing Z to explicitly offer the pair (x 1 , x 2 ) for $9, both A and Z benefit, as does economic efficiency.…”

Section: Corporate Sourcingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Computational Decision Support Regret-Based Models for Optimization and Preference Elicitation

Boutilier¹

2013

Comparative Decision Making

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Section: Corporate Sourcingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Computational Decision Support Regret-Based Models for Optimization and Preference Elicitation

Boutilier¹

2013

Comparative Decision Making

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“…The literature on combinatorial auctions is too big to survey here; see the book [6] and book chapter [3] for general information on the topic. Related work on combinatorial auctions with item bidding, also mentioned above, are [2,5,21] for second-price auctions and [12] for first-price auctions.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More precisely, suppose there are m goods and each buyer i has a private valuation v i that assigns a value v i (S) to each bundle (i.e., subset) S of goods. For example, each good could represent a license for exclusive use of a given frequency range in a given geographic area, buyers could correspond to mobile telecommunication companies, and valuations then describe a company's willingness to pay for a given collection of licenses [6]. One natural objective function, for example when the seller is the government, is welfare maximization: partition the goods into bundles S 1 , .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simultaneous Single-Item Auctions

Bhawalkar

Roughgarden

2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. In a combinatorial auction (CA) with item bidding, several goods are sold simultaneously via single-item auctions. We study how the equilibrium performance of such an auction depends on the choice of the underlying single-item auction. We provide a thorough understanding of the price of anarchy, as a function of the single-item auction payment rule. When the payment rule depends on the winner's bid, as in a first-price auction, we characterize the worst-case price of anarchy in the corresponding CAs with item bidding in terms of a sensitivity measure of the payment rule. As a corollary, we show that equilibrium existence guarantees broader than that of the first-price rule can only be achieved by sacrificing its property of having only fully efficient (pure) Nash equilibria. For payment rules that are independent of the winner's bid, we prove a strong optimality result for the canonical second-price auction. First, its set of pure Nash equilibria is always a superset of that of every other payment rule. Despite this, its worst-case POA is no worse than that of any other payment rule that is independent of the winner's bid.

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“…A variety of industries have used combinatorial auctions, including truckload transportation, bus routes, industrial procurement, and most famously, FCC spectrum auctions (Cramton et al 2006). In spectrum auctions, different bandwidths can serve as substitutes or as complements for different firms.…”

Section: Competition With Complementarities and Substitutesmentioning

confidence: 99%