Introduction: through a handbook

Romanova, Tatiana; David, Maxine

doi:10.4324/9781351006262-1

Cited by 1 publication

(3 citation statements)

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“…The ability to predict partners’ future actions is crucial to successful cooperation, since countries make assumptions about other countries’ goals and choose their strategies accordingly (Gilligan and Johns, 2012). This is particularly important for diffuse reciprocity because diffuse reciprocity is less predictable than specific reciprocity (Romanova, 2014). The lack of information is particularly problematic in human rights agreements because non-compliance injures individuals, not cooperating countries.…”

Section: Reciprocity and Human Rights Treaties Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Countries would therefore have no immediate knowledge about the level of peers’ compliance. Monitoring mitigates this problem by informing countries of other countries’ policies, providing clues as to their strategic intentions, and detecting defections (Romanova, 2014; Wolfson, 2015).…”

Section: Reciprocity and Human Rights Treaties Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It does so by extending the norm adoption instance from a one-time ratification act to an iterative practice of compliance over time, thereby extending the shadow of the future (Hafner-Burton et al, 2014). Without monitoring, the interaction between states ends with treaty ratification, and the iterated interaction that is crucial to diffuse reciprocity is not possible (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011; Romanova, 2014). This is particularly important in the implementation of the ICESCR which has a built-in ‘progressive realization’ principle.…”

Section: Reciprocity and Human Rights Treaties Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reciprocating to the bottom: Is there negative diffuse reciprocity in social economic human rights

Kahn-Nisser

2022

International Political Science Review

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Is reciprocity possible in human rights agreements? This article argues that human rights agreements can create negative diffuse reciprocity if there is reliable information about countries’ compliance levels. The article analyses the link between information on countries’ non-compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the one hand, and countries’ efforts to protect social economic rights on the other. It finds that the more information is published on violations of rights, the lower the levels of countries’ efforts to protect these rights. This means that countries practice negative diffuse reciprocity with regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This is a notable finding since there are several factors working against the practice of reciprocity in human rights agreements. The article draws theoretical conclusions regarding the conditions for reciprocity in human rights agreements and sheds new light on the concept of reciprocity and its link with information.

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Section: Reciprocity and Human Rights Treaties Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Reciprocity and Human Rights Treaties Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%