Introduction: The European Union and Russia

The EU under a realist scope: Employing a neoclassical realist framework for the analysis of the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement offer to Ukraine

“…74 David et al argue that the member states which have warm bilateral relations with Russia engage in 'two-level game': 'taking a much more pragmatic stance' bilaterally while 'concurring with the more normative-based multilateral agenda' at the EU level. 75 Thus, in the scope of the EU's AA offer to Ukraine, the pro-Ukraine cohort of Sweden, Poland and Lithuania was somewhat stymied by the member states which had progressive bilateral relations with Russia, resulting in the conspicuous absence of a clear membership perspective for Ukraine. Furthermore, internal decision-making constrains were cited by both DG Trade and EEAS officials (practitioners from institutions on the other side of the decision-making process) as being a key detriment to the EU formulating the most coherent and effective external trade policy for Ukraine.…”

The Unintended Consequences of a European Neighbourhood Policy without Russia

“…Little was done inside the EU to coordinate or reconcile its contradictory ENP/EaP policies with its Russia policy. This was not helped by the "diffusion of competencies" (David Gower, Haukkala 2013, 3) within the EU vis-à-vis Russia, but equally vis-à-vis the EaP states.…”

The Partnership for Modernisation Through the Three Level-of-Analysis Perspectives

“…New member states have brought to the EU's Russia policy their peculiar problems and visions; that contrasted with the position of old member states (Roth, 2009;David et al, 2011). Bringing national external problems to the EU's level is a legitimate practice; however, it did not do much good for EU-Russian relations.…”