Abstract:The IPBES Framework aims to allow room for a plurality of values and recently proposed a move from `Ecosystem Services’ to `Nature’s Contributions to People’. O’Connor and Kenter (2019) argue that both approaches still disregard nature as an end in itself. Therefore, they propose a new conceptualisation of `intrinsic value’ and a new approach, labelled the `Life Framework of Values’. This work is highly relevant, but we argue that there are some fundamental conceptual problems with their current account, in pa… Show more
“…In this paper, we respond to these comments, and in doing so re-instate the salience of the Life Framework as a straightforward way of organising environmental values compatible with diverse conceptual frameworks, including ecosystem Services (ES) and nature's contributions to people (NCP), whilst at the same time seeking to move beyond their ethical and ontological limitations in terms of anthropocentrism and dualism (Jax et al 2013;Silvertown 2015;Cooper et al 2016;Kopnina et al 2018;Kenter 2018;Kolinjivadi 2019;Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun 2021). Neuteleers et al (2020) acknowledge these critiques and are generally supportive of the introduction of the Life Framework as an organisational framework for valuing nature, which they describe as "promising" (p. 313). In particular, the authors commend its solid conceptual foundations in environmental philosophy, its transition away from a one-directional flow of benefits and services from nature to people; and the way the Life Framework creates space for the inclusion of intrinsic values.…”
Section: Valuation Of Nature and Nature's Contributions To Peoplementioning
confidence: 96%
“…Whilst empirical work applying the framework has recently started appearing (O'Connor and Kenter 2019;Reed et al 2020;Harmáčková et al 2021;Kelly-Quinn et al 2022;Azzopardi et al 2022), Neuteleers et al (2020) have opened debate about how the framework was evolved from the original three frames described by O'Neill et al (2008) and how we interpreted intrinsic and relational values when defining the framework. In this paper, we respond to these comments, and in doing so re-instate the salience of the Life Framework as a straightforward way of organising environmental values compatible with diverse conceptual frameworks, including ecosystem Services (ES) and nature's contributions to people (NCP), whilst at the same time seeking to move beyond their ethical and ontological limitations in terms of anthropocentrism and dualism (Jax et al 2013;Silvertown 2015;Cooper et al 2016;Kopnina et al 2018;Kenter 2018;Kolinjivadi 2019;Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun 2021).…”
Section: Valuation Of Nature and Nature's Contributions To Peoplementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Whilst the discussion of intrinsic and relational value definitions is somewhat independent of the basic merits of the Life Framework, their clarification also helps to elucidate how the Life Framework can be applied as a way to practically recognise plural values of, for and in relation to nature, or the morethan-human world. Finally, the fifth section will address concerns by Neuteleers et al (2020) around the practicality and operationalisation of the framework by outlining its key functions and purposes for research and policy.…”
Section: Valuation Of Nature and Nature's Contributions To Peoplementioning
confidence: 99%
“…These sources of concern include the sustainability of our resource use (living from), the cultural significance of our environments (living in), and nature as an object of conservation, including as a direct object of value (living with). Neuteleers et al (2020) see this framework as a way to intuitively communicate the trifecta of value justifications of instrumental, intrinsic and relational values, which could be straightforwardly mapped to them. Consequently, introduction of the living as nature frame would overcomplicate things.…”
Section: Valuation Of Nature and Nature's Contributions To Peoplementioning
The Life Framework of Values links the richness of ways we experience and think of nature with the diverse ways nature matters. In this paper, we further develop and clarify the Life Framework in response to comments by Neuteleers et al. (Sustain Sci 14(1):4, 2020, 10.1007/s11625-020-00825-7). They supported its application to move beyond the instrumentalism and anthropocentrism associated with ecosystem services and nature’s contributions to people, but were critical of our addition of the living as nature frame to O’Neill et al.’s (Environmental values. Routledge, London, 2008) original three (living from, in and with the natural world), and of the way we defined intrinsic and relational values. We argue that the original presentation of the frames was as distinct sources of concern for nature. The living as frame, characterised by oneness between nature and people, presents a unique source of concern not adequately represented by the original three frames. Whilst the Life Framework is open to diverse definitions of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values, we present straightforward interpretations that are compatible with multiple ethical systems and can effectively serve deliberative processes. We demonstrate that intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values do not map onto the life frames one-to-one, as each frame layers multiple value justifications. Whilst a key purpose of the Life Framework is to facilitate recognition of a more inclusive set of values in valuation and policy, it can also enable more effective organisation, communication, assessment, bridging and deliberation of values. It also provides multiple levers for sustainability transformation, particularly by fully recognising holistic and relational understandings of people and nature.
“…In this paper, we respond to these comments, and in doing so re-instate the salience of the Life Framework as a straightforward way of organising environmental values compatible with diverse conceptual frameworks, including ecosystem Services (ES) and nature's contributions to people (NCP), whilst at the same time seeking to move beyond their ethical and ontological limitations in terms of anthropocentrism and dualism (Jax et al 2013;Silvertown 2015;Cooper et al 2016;Kopnina et al 2018;Kenter 2018;Kolinjivadi 2019;Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun 2021). Neuteleers et al (2020) acknowledge these critiques and are generally supportive of the introduction of the Life Framework as an organisational framework for valuing nature, which they describe as "promising" (p. 313). In particular, the authors commend its solid conceptual foundations in environmental philosophy, its transition away from a one-directional flow of benefits and services from nature to people; and the way the Life Framework creates space for the inclusion of intrinsic values.…”
Section: Valuation Of Nature and Nature's Contributions To Peoplementioning
confidence: 96%
“…Whilst empirical work applying the framework has recently started appearing (O'Connor and Kenter 2019;Reed et al 2020;Harmáčková et al 2021;Kelly-Quinn et al 2022;Azzopardi et al 2022), Neuteleers et al (2020) have opened debate about how the framework was evolved from the original three frames described by O'Neill et al (2008) and how we interpreted intrinsic and relational values when defining the framework. In this paper, we respond to these comments, and in doing so re-instate the salience of the Life Framework as a straightforward way of organising environmental values compatible with diverse conceptual frameworks, including ecosystem Services (ES) and nature's contributions to people (NCP), whilst at the same time seeking to move beyond their ethical and ontological limitations in terms of anthropocentrism and dualism (Jax et al 2013;Silvertown 2015;Cooper et al 2016;Kopnina et al 2018;Kenter 2018;Kolinjivadi 2019;Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun 2021).…”
Section: Valuation Of Nature and Nature's Contributions To Peoplementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Whilst the discussion of intrinsic and relational value definitions is somewhat independent of the basic merits of the Life Framework, their clarification also helps to elucidate how the Life Framework can be applied as a way to practically recognise plural values of, for and in relation to nature, or the morethan-human world. Finally, the fifth section will address concerns by Neuteleers et al (2020) around the practicality and operationalisation of the framework by outlining its key functions and purposes for research and policy.…”
Section: Valuation Of Nature and Nature's Contributions To Peoplementioning
confidence: 99%
“…These sources of concern include the sustainability of our resource use (living from), the cultural significance of our environments (living in), and nature as an object of conservation, including as a direct object of value (living with). Neuteleers et al (2020) see this framework as a way to intuitively communicate the trifecta of value justifications of instrumental, intrinsic and relational values, which could be straightforwardly mapped to them. Consequently, introduction of the living as nature frame would overcomplicate things.…”
Section: Valuation Of Nature and Nature's Contributions To Peoplementioning
The Life Framework of Values links the richness of ways we experience and think of nature with the diverse ways nature matters. In this paper, we further develop and clarify the Life Framework in response to comments by Neuteleers et al. (Sustain Sci 14(1):4, 2020, 10.1007/s11625-020-00825-7). They supported its application to move beyond the instrumentalism and anthropocentrism associated with ecosystem services and nature’s contributions to people, but were critical of our addition of the living as nature frame to O’Neill et al.’s (Environmental values. Routledge, London, 2008) original three (living from, in and with the natural world), and of the way we defined intrinsic and relational values. We argue that the original presentation of the frames was as distinct sources of concern for nature. The living as frame, characterised by oneness between nature and people, presents a unique source of concern not adequately represented by the original three frames. Whilst the Life Framework is open to diverse definitions of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values, we present straightforward interpretations that are compatible with multiple ethical systems and can effectively serve deliberative processes. We demonstrate that intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values do not map onto the life frames one-to-one, as each frame layers multiple value justifications. Whilst a key purpose of the Life Framework is to facilitate recognition of a more inclusive set of values in valuation and policy, it can also enable more effective organisation, communication, assessment, bridging and deliberation of values. It also provides multiple levers for sustainability transformation, particularly by fully recognising holistic and relational understandings of people and nature.
“…There is, however, considerable disagreement over the extent to which NCPs add to the ecosystem services approach or improve practical conservation policies (Kadykalo et al, 2019; Kenter, 2018; Peterson et al, 2018). Other conceptualizations such as the ‘Life Framework of Values’ are now being proposed (O’Connor & Kenter, 2019), and are again subject to academic controversy (Neuteleers et al, 2020).…”
Section: Challenges Of Understanding Human–nature Relationships: Less...mentioning
In this paper, we operationalize the concept of Societal Relationships with Nature (SRN) as a framework for understanding nature‐related conflicts and multiple values.
Based on three dimensions knowledgescape, interactions and identity, we propose a set of questions for the empirical analysis of conflict situations.
We use two case studies—designation of a biosphere reserve in southern Chile and the return of the wolf in Germany—to illustrate how the SRN framework can reveal and structure the complexity of human–nature relationships.
From the conceptual advances and the academic debate on multiple values of nature, we derive four requirements for approaches to analyse nature‐related conflicts and how different stakeholders attribute importance to nature.
These should (a) cover the relevant aspects and reveal the critical issues underlying a conflict, (b) enable an understanding of differences and commonalities in people’s perspectives and positions, (c) be comprehensive enough to uncover important issues in complex situations without losing empirical practicability and (d) take power relations into account.
We discuss whether and how the SRN framework meets these requirements.
We present the SRN framework in particular to the academic community working at the interface with policy and practice on multiple values of nature and nature‐related conflicts.
SRN analysis can also be applied to complement valuation approaches by specifying and explaining differences in people’s attributions of value to nature.
Read the free Plain Language Summary for this article on the Journal blog.
Economic environmental valuation remains a much debated and contested issue. Concerns have been voiced that it is unable to capture the manifold immaterial values of ecosystems due to conceptual and methodological issues. Thus, additional value categories (social values) as well as novel valuation approaches like deliberative (monetary) valuation are areas of growing interest, yet the theoretical foundations are rather weak. Against this background, this article aims to develop a consistent conceptual framework for making sense of social values in economic environmental valuation. Based on a holistic view of society and individuals, the role of institutions, the social environment, culture and transcendental values is emphasised. To synthesise diverging concepts of value into an economic concept and to account for the multidimensionality of social values, the framework consists of three spheres: social, natural and contextual. The novel framework demonstrates that social values may be integrated into a preference-based utility framework when denoting a holistic understanding of social preferences and human embeddedness in nature and society.
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