Intrinsic cognitive models

Abstract

Theories concerning the structure, or format, of mental representation should (1) be formulated in mechanistic, rather than metaphorical terms; (2) do justice to several philosophical intuitions about mental representation; and (3) explain the human capacity to predict the consequences of worldly alterations (i.e., to think before we act). The hypothesis that thinking involves the application of syntax-sensitive inference rules to syntactically structured mental representations has been said to satisfy all three conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that thinking requires the construction and manipulation of the cognitive equivalent of scale models. A reading of this hypothesis is provided that satisfies condition (1) and which, even though it may not fully satisfy condition (2), turns out (in light of the frame problem) to be the only known way to satisfy condition (3).

Maps, languages, and manguages: Rival cognitive architectures?

“…However, the importance of this point should not be underestimated. For example, Waskan (2003Waskan ( , 2006 shows how some computerized scale models of simple scenarios behave like mental representations of the scenes. But of course, the models don't do this by themselves (nor do they solve the frame Philosophical Psychology 3 problem, as Waskan suggests).…”

“…The "maps" in question can just as easily be three-dimensional scale models (Waskan, 2003(Waskan, , 2006, or even higher-dimensional representations. Although I will continue to use standard two-dimensional maps in the discussion, everything that is said about them applies to more complex structures with an n-dimensional (not necessarily Euclidean) geometry.…”

“…This obligation appears in multiple places, too. For instance, if you adopt the very common claim that only maps are "iconic," differing from sentences "in virtue of their resemblance to what they represent" (Blumson, 2012, p. 414;Waskan, 2003), then you need to say what this resemblance amounts to at the computational level of characterization (e.g., Shepard & Metzler's 1971 famous study of mental rotation). Since I don't think that our scanty present empirical understanding supports any such distinction, I owe no such story.…”

The Role of Culture and Meaning in Rational Choice

“…Because the discovery of meaning is for the most part a non-conscious process, the complexity of the process is hidden and we are often unaware of the situations where it fails. A significant body of research has addressed various aspects of this problem, for example, in language Wittgnstien's (1955) referential indeterminacy and Chomsky's (1965) the-poverty-of-the-stimulus argument and in cognitive science (see, Ketelar & Todd 2001, Waskan 2003, the frame problem, from different perspectives, all basically address the difficulties involving the determination of meaning that results form the fact that perception, cognition and action planning, as well as language use, language learning and learning in general, are ill posed problems. 5 There does not seem to be enough externally provided stimuli to learn a language, in perception to determine what is out there, or to select the optimal action from among a virtually infinite number of possible actions.…”

A vehicular theory of corporeal qualia (a gift to computationalists)

“…For this reason, I have taken great pains to demonstrate that certain computer scientists and engineers have, by creating what are known as finite element models, inadvertently shown precisely this (Waskan 2003(Waskan , 2006(Waskan , 2008. What their work shows, in particular, is that because nonsentential images and models can be realized by (strict) computations, they too can-if not directly, then at least indirectly via computations-also be realized by neural machinations.…”