Maps, languages, and manguages: Rival cognitive architectures?

Abstract

Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms.-David Hume, A treatise of human nature, Book 1, section VII Map-like representations are frequently invoked as an alternative type of representational vehicle to a language of thought. This view presupposes that map-systems and languages form legitimate natural kinds of cognitive representational systems. I argue that they do not, because the collections of features that might be taken as characteristic of maps or languages do not themselves provide scientifically useful information above and beyond what the individual features provide. To bring this out, I sketch several allegedly distinctive features of maps, and show how they can easily be grafted onto a simple logical language, resulting in a hybrid "manguage." The ease with which these linguistic and map-like properties can be integrated into a single representational system raises the question of what work broader categories like language and map are doing. I maintain that, as an empirical matter of fact, they serve no particular purpose in cognitive science, and thus do not characterize distinct kinds of cognitive architectures.

On Iconic-Discursive Representations: Do they Bring us Closer to a Humean Representational Mind?

“…8 Maps are certainly of the utmost interest, as they certainly challenge Fodor's stipulations. It is no wonder they have been the focus of much attention in the literature see, for example, Camps (2007) and Johnson (2015). However, they are beyond the scope of this paper, as the way they challenge the canonical view on representational kinds differs from that of iconic discourses.…”

Heterogeneous inferences with maps

“…2 See, however, (Johnson 2015). 3 Camp, 2007;Casati & Varzi, 1999;Heck, 2007;Rescorla, 2009a;2009b;2009c.…”

Graphic rules in planning: A critical exploration of normative drawings starting from zoning maps and form-based codes

“…The fact that graphic rules are widespread in planning practices, and indeed typical of them, makes rules of this kind a particularly significant field of interest for planning theory. An important point to stress is that while analysis of images used descriptively has been under way for some time (although in many respects it is anything but conclusive – Camp, 2007; Johnson, 2014; Maynard, 2005 – despite what is generally thought), analysis of images used as rules is still in its infancy – both in general and in the specific field of planning theory. 4 As Patrick Maynard (2014) observes, ’graphic norms seems an original topic’, which ’has to date received little attention’.…”