Intransitivity of Paired Comparisons Related to Gender and Community Socioeconomic Setting

Riechard, Donald E.

doi:10.1080/00220973.1991.10806614

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…We applied the above methods in our reanalysis of acrossparticipants data that were originally either published (Birnbaum, Patton, & Lott, 1999;Böckenholt, 1992a;Bradbury & Moscato, 1982;Bradbury & Nelson, 1974;Chen & Corter, 2006;Humphrey, 2001;Kirkpatrick, Rand, & Ryan, 2006;Kivetz & Simonson, 2000;Loomes, Starmer, & Sugden, 1989, 1991Loomes & Taylor, 1992;May, 1954;Roelofsma & Read, 2000;Sopher & Gigliotti, 1993;Starmer, 1999;Starmer & Sugden, 1998) or made available to us (Birnbaum & Gutierrez, 2007;Lee et al, 2009).…”

Section: A Reanalysis Of Across-participants Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Typically, this involves counting the number of cyclical choice triples across many respondents, who each made every paired comparison once. This number is used to descriptively measure the degree of intransitivity of a respondent group in a given experimental condition (Bradbury & Nelson, 1974; Budescu & Weiss, 1987; Chen & Corter, 2006; Gonzalez-Vallejo, Bonazzi, & Shapiro, 1996; Lee, Amir, & Ariely, 2009; May, 1954; Mellers & Biagini, 1994; Mellers, Chang, Birnbaum, & Ordonez, 1992; Ranyard, 1977; Riechard, 1991; Sopher & Narramore, 2000; Treadwell, Kearney, & Davila, 2000; Tversky, 1969).…”

Section: Existing Probabilistic Models For the Axiom Of Transitivity ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Transitivity of preferences.

Regenwetter

Dana

Davis‐Stober

2011

Psychological Review

259

328

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Transitivity of preferences is a fundamental principle shared by most major contemporary rational, prescriptive, and descriptive models of decision making. To have transitive preferences, a person, group, or society that prefers choice option x to y and y to z must prefer x to z. Any claim of empirical violations of transitivity by individual decision makers requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. We discuss why unambiguous evidence is currently lacking and how to clarify the issue. In counterpoint to Tversky's (1969) seminal "Intransitivity of Preferences," we reconsider his data as well as those from more than 20 other studies of intransitive human or animal decision makers. We challenge the standard operationalizations of transitive preferences and discuss pervasive methodological problems in the collection, modeling, and analysis of relevant empirical data. For example, violations of weak stochastic transitivity do not imply violations of transitivity of preference. Building on past multidisciplinary work, we use parsimonious mixture models, where the space of permissible preference states is the family of (transitive) strict linear orders. We show that the data from many of the available studies designed to elicit intransitive choice are consistent with transitive preferences.

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Section: A Reanalysis Of Across-participants Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Existing Probabilistic Models For the Axiom Of Transitivity ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Transitivity of preferences.

Regenwetter

Dana

Davis‐Stober

2011

Psychological Review

259

328

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For multiple respondents, their “total degree of intransitivity” is often operationalized as the sum of their “numbers of violations” (for examples, see, e.g. May, 1954 ; Tversky, 1969 ; Bradbury and Nelson, 1974 ; Ranyard, 1977 ; Budescu and Weiss, 1987 ; Riechard, 1991 ; Mellers et al, 1992 ; Mellers and Biagini, 1994 ; Gonzalez-Vallejo et al, 1996 ; Sopher and Narramore, 2000 ; Treadwell et al, 2000 ; Chen and Corter, 2006 ; Lee et al, 2009 ). To the extent that respondents and their decisions result from a random sampling process, this “degree of intransitivity” forms a random variable.…”

Section: Probabilistic Models For the Axiom Of (Preference) Transitivmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing Transitivity of Preferences on Two-Alternative Forced Choice Data

Regenwetter¹,

Dana²,

Davis‐Stober³

2010

Front. Psychology

116

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As Duncan Luce and other prominent scholars have pointed out on several occasions, testing algebraic models against empirical data raises difficult conceptual, mathematical, and statistical challenges. Empirical data often result from statistical sampling processes, whereas algebraic theories are nonprobabilistic. Many probabilistic specifications lead to statistical boundary problems and are subject to nontrivial order constrained statistical inference. The present paper discusses Luce's challenge for a particularly prominent axiom: Transitivity. The axiom of transitivity is a central component in many algebraic theories of preference and choice. We offer the currently most complete solution to the challenge in the case of transitivity of binary preference on the theory side and two-alternative forced choice on the empirical side, explicitly for up to five, and implicitly for up to seven, choice alternatives. We also discuss the relationship between our proposed solution and weak stochastic transitivity. We recommend to abandon the latter as a model of transitive individual preferences.

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Consistency in paired comparisons of Information Needs Questionnaires (INQ) among Hong Kong Chinese breast cancer patients

Choi

et al. 2013

European Journal of Oncology Nursing

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Intransitivity of Paired Comparisons Related to Gender and Community Socioeconomic Setting

Cited by 3 publications

References 19 publications

Transitivity of preferences.

Transitivity of preferences.

Testing Transitivity of Preferences on Two-Alternative Forced Choice Data

Consistency in paired comparisons of Information Needs Questionnaires (INQ) among Hong Kong Chinese breast cancer patients

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