Interpreters of International Economic Law: Corporations and Bureaucrats in Contest over Chile's Nutrition Label

Abstract

This article analyzes the everyday interpretive practices of corporations and bureaucrats that shape the meaning and force of international economic law. To understand how common practices such as public consultation submissions, corporate threat letters, and external legal assistance influence regulators' understanding of their “legally available” policy space, we study the contested introduction of a pioneering nutrition labeling regulation in Chile. The transnational food industry powerfully challenged the regulation's legality under World Trade Organization law. But Chilean health bureaucrats, in coordination with segments of the country's legally highly competent economic bureaucracy, effectively defended the legality of their proposed regulatory measure. Drawing on data from freedom‐of‐information requests and in‐depth interviews, the article argues that the outcomes of such interpretive contests are substantially shaped by participants' knowledge of the entitlements created by international economic law and thus by the international legal expertise they have access to. This often but not always puts transnational corporations at an advantage over national regulators in the strategic interpretation of international economic law.

A human rights-based approach to non-communicable diseases: mandating front-of-package warning labels

“…This industry has engaged in multiple tactics to interfere and influence the adoption of public health measures, including spreading misinformation on the health and economic impacts of public health measures, initiating or threatening litigation, promoting weaker alternatives, and contesting the legality of such measures under international trade law [ 36 , 37 ]. For example, the food industry met Chile’s front-of-package labeling law with intense controversy over the compatibility of the law with World Trade Organization agreements [ 33 ]. Even though the Chilean government overcame this barrier, it nevertheless caused significant delays in its efforts to adopt a front-of-package warning labeling system [ 33 ].…”

“…The food and beverage industry strongly opposes front-of-package warning labeling systems, and has put forth baseless arguments as to why they should not be implemented, including the negative impacts on trade, high costs of implementation, and consumer responsibility to make educated consumption decisions [ 24 ]. While there is scant evidence supporting these arguments, the real downside of implementing front-of-package labeling systems derives from the industry opposition itself [ 24 , 33 ]. Governments must have an enormous amount of time, resources, and political will to overcome well-funded and coordinated industry opposition tactics [ 24 , 33 ].…”

“…While there is scant evidence supporting these arguments, the real downside of implementing front-of-package labeling systems derives from the industry opposition itself [ 24 , 33 ]. Governments must have an enormous amount of time, resources, and political will to overcome well-funded and coordinated industry opposition tactics [ 24 , 33 ]. Furthermore, it takes a robust legal scheme to enforce front-of-package labeling requirements once adopted.…”

“…Furthermore, it takes a robust legal scheme to enforce front-of-package labeling requirements once adopted. Where the food and beverage industry succeeds in dismantling any aspect of that scheme, the effectiveness of the labeling in yielding healthier consumer decisions could be diminished [ 24 , 33 ]. Still, several countries have demonstrated that overcoming industry opposition is both possible and worthwhile for supporting the right to health through informed consumer decisions [ 30 , 31 ].…”

Transparency in the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements: The Real Jewel in the Crown by Marianna B. Karttunen Cambridge University Press, 2020

“…By shifting academic attention to seemingly mundane everyday processes such as managing notifications and discussing so-called Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO committees, this contribution heralds a broader trend in the trade literature. Partly motivated by the paralysis of the WTO's negotiation and dispute settlement functions, a new generation of scholars has recently focused their curiosity (and PhD dissertations) on the organization's ‘regular work’, which is mainly concerned with implementation and monitoring (Manak, 2019; Dorlach and Mertenskötter, 2020). Overall, Karttunen provides a convincing and innovative, albeit at times more descriptive than analytical, account of transparency in the multilateral trade system.…”