International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics

Abstract

This study examines mediation as an exercise in which the mediator has interests and operates in a context of power politics and cost‐benefit calculation. It is based on eight cases of international mediation‐the U.S.S.R. between India and Pakistan (1966), Algeria between Iran and Iraq (1975), the United States and Great Britain in Rhodesia (1975–1979), the five Western States in Namibia (1977–1983), Algeria between the United States and Iran (1980–1981), and the ongoing activities of the Organization of African Unity, The Organization of American States, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. It was found that a mediator intervenes because of its interest in the conflict or in obtaining an outcome, and it can play three roles‐communicator, formulator, manipulator‐ in accomplishing its objectives. The mediator is accepted by the parties, not because of its neutrality but because of its ability to produce an attractive outcome. The mediator's power, or leverage, comes from the parties' need for a solution, from its ability to shift weight among parties, and from side payments.

The process of international mediation: An analysis of the determinants of successful and unsuccessful outcomes

“…For instance, some writers (Jackson 1952;Northedge and Donelan 1971;Young 1967) emphasise the importance of evenhandedness on the part of the mediator for achieving a successful outcome. Others (for example, Zartman and Touval 1985;Frei 1976) argue that the availability of vital resources to the mediator outweighs impartially in effecting a successful settlement.…”

Intervention Without Leverage: Explaining the Prevalence of Weak Mediators

“…First, third parties can alter the costs of conflict (Beardsley et al 2006;Carnevale 1986;Quinn et al 2006;Rauchhaus 2006;Schrodt and Gerner 2004;Smith and Stam 2003;Wilkenfeld et al 2005;Zartman and Touval 1985) through threatening the intransigent parties with negative sanctions. Such sanctions may be in the form of a reduction in economic relations or aid.…”

Towards a Paradigm of Multiparty Negotiation

“…Third parties can assist (facilitate) primary parties intentionally or unintentionally. They are most often described as mediational and/or arbitrational (Berman and Johnson 1977;Davison 1974;Kressel and Pruitt 1989;MenkelMeadow 2001;Miller 1994;Sheppard 1984;Susskind 2000;Touval 1975;Touval and Zartman 2001;Wall, Stark and Standifer 2001;Zartman and Touval 1985). Supporting Primary Party Relations -Primary parties may receive assistance from parties that do not "own" the negotiation and are not third parties.…”

“…A final prominent theme in the international domain that requires consideration is third parties generally, and mediation spe cifically (Bercovitch and Jackson 2001;Bercovitch and Rubin 1992;Princen 1992;Young 1967). Third parties play a contractual or neutral role in international nego tiations or an emergent role where the third party has an interest in the outcome and the power to influence outcomes (Diehl, Druckman and Wall 1998;Lall 1985;Touval 1975;Umbricht 1989;Watkins and Winters 1997;Zartman and Touval 1985). Any actor in the global environment can become a mediator (Bercovitch 1992).…”

“…Con currently, other settings tolerate and even accept third parties with alignments to a primary party. We first became aware of such phenomena through the international domain (Touval 1975;Touval and Zartman 1989;Zartman and Touval 1985) followed by the organizational domain (Carnevale 1986;Conlon 1988;Conlon, Carnevale and Murnighan 1994;Murnighan 1986). In addition, third parties that are aligned to one or more primary parties are common in cultures t hat are highly formal (on a formal -informal scale) and that also seek to avoid conflict.…”