Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures

Demange, Gabrielle

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(94)90035-3

Cited by 129 publications

(127 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…For the subclass of tree games Herings et al (2008) recently introduced the average tree solution (AT solution), being the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all directed spanning trees of the graph. The AT solution is easy to compute and belongs to the core of the game if the game is superadditive, as is proved in Herings et al (2008) and follows from earlier results in Demange (1994Demange ( , 2004, Kaneko and Wooders (1982), and Le Breton et al (1992).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 64%

A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games

Mishra

Talman

2009

Int J Game Theory

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 64%

A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games

Mishra

Talman

2009

Int J Game Theory

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“…Nonemptyness of the core under these circumstances has already been shown in Le Breton, Owen and Weber (1992) and Demange (1994). Demange (2004) already mentions that the Core of the restricted game can have extreme points that are not hierarchical outcomes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 77%

“…Whenever S is not feasible it can earn the sum of the worths of its components in Myerson (1977) proposes to take for every communication situation the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) of the corresponding restricted game, a solution that is later named the Myerson value for communication situations. Alternatively, Le Breton, Owen and Weber (1992) and Demange (1994Demange ( , 2004 consider the Core of the restricted game for the special class of communication situations where the game is superadditive and the communication graph is cycle-free, respectively, a tree.…”

Section: Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

On hierarchies and communication

Brink

2011

Soc Choice Welf

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractMany economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In the literature the distinction between these two types of relational structures is not always clear. In models of restricted cooperation this distinction should be defined by properties of the set of feasible coalitions. We characterize the feasible sets in communication networks and compare them with feasible sets arising from hierarchies.

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“…The core of any superadditive game built on intermediate preferences on a tree is non-empty (Demange 1994). In particular the core of a majority game is non-empty under intermediate preferences.…”

Section: Median Representative Rulementioning

confidence: 99%

Majority relation and median representative ordering

Demange

2011

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This paper presents results on the transitivity of the majority relation and the existence of a median representative ordering. Building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, the analysis extends well-known results obtained when the underlying graph is a line. In contrast with other types of restrictions such as single-peakedness, intermediate preferences allow for a clear distinction between restrictions on the set of preferences characteristics and those on the set of alternatives.

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Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures

Cited by 129 publications

References 13 publications

A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games

A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games

On hierarchies and communication

Majority relation and median representative ordering

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