Interference in joint picture naming.

Gambi, Chiara; Cavey, Joris Van de; Pickering, Martin J.

doi:10.1037/a0037438

Cited by 29 publications

(109 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…If it were, we should have observed a reliable difference between the conditions even when leaders were unable to observe the followers’ actions. There is evidence that coactors seated in separate rooms can represent each other’s actions (Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2011; Gambi, Van de Cavey, & Pickering, 2015). Therefore, a strong version of the anticipation account would predict that merely knowing whether the partner would respond with a compatible or an incompatible action should influence the leader’s action execution (Pfister, Pfeuffer, & Kunde, 2014).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spontaneous adaptation explains why people act faster when being imitated

Lelonkiewicz

Gambi

2016

Psychon Bull Rev

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The human ability to perform joint actions is often attributed to high-level cognitive processes. For example, the finding that action leaders act faster when imitated by their partners has been interpreted as evidence for anticipation of the other’s actions (Pfister, Dignath, Hommel, & Kunde, 2013). In two experiments, we showed that a low-level mechanism can account for this finding. Action leaders were faster when imitated than when counterimitated, but only if they could observe their partner’s actions (Exp. 1). Crucially, when due to our manipulation the partner’s imitative actions became slower than the counterimitative actions, leaders also became slower when they were imitated, and faster when counterimitated (Exp. 2). Our results suggest that spontaneous temporal adaptation is a key mechanism in joint action tasks. We argue for a reconsideration of other phenomena that have traditionally been attributed solely to high-level processes.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.3758/s13423-016-1141-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spontaneous adaptation explains why people act faster when being imitated

Lelonkiewicz

Gambi

2016

Psychon Bull Rev

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“…Earlier work by Gambi, van de Cavey, and Pickering (2015) showed that speakers performing a joint naming task represented the partner's task, i.e. whether or not the partner also had to name objects, but not the content of the partner's speech plan.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This suggests that what is ideal for conversation may involve only minimally representing a partner's plan. The current work followed directly from this study, using a simplified version of the Gambi et al (2015) paradigm. As such, we begin by describing their procedure and results in detail.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mental representations of partner task cause interference in picture naming

2019

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Interference in picture naming occurs from representing a partner's preparations to speak (Gambi, van de Cavey, & Pickering, 2015). We tested the origins of this interference using a simple non-communicative joint naming task based on Gambi et al. (2015), where response latencies indexed interference from partner task and partner speech content, and eye fixations to partner objects indexed overt attention. Experiment 1 contrasted a partnerpresent condition with a control partner-absent condition to establish the role of the partner in eliciting interference. For latencies, we observed interference from the partner's task and speech content, with interference increasing due to partner task in the partner-present condition. Eye-tracking measures showed that interference in naming was not due to overt attention to partner stimuli but to broad expectations about likely utterances. Experiment 2 examined whether an equivalent non-verbal task also elicited interference, as predicted from a language as joint action framework. We replicated the finding of interference due to partner task and again found no relationship between overt attention and interference. These results support Gambi et al. (2015). Individuals co-represent a partner's task while speaking, and doing so does not require overt attention to partner stimuli.

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“…One might argue that in the absence of any direct across-speaker effects (i.e., no direct context effect in Experiment 2), we cannot be sure that our participants corepresented their partner's speech. However, this seems unlikely, given the fact that Gambi, van de Cavey, and Pickering (2015) found evidence that merely imagining another person's response interfered with one's own naming in a non-interactive context (participants sat in adjacent soundproof booths and could only peripherally see each other through a small window). If there is evidence for mental corepresentation in situations in which it is irrelevant for one's own actions, as was the case in Gambi et al's (2015) study, we should expect it even more in a real communicative situation, that is, in a situation in which two speakers must coordinate their responses to reach a common communicative goal and need to listen to their partner in order to be able to perform their own task.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatic constraints do not prevent the co-activation of alternative names: evidence from sequential naming tasks with one and two speakers

Mädebach

Kurtz

Schriefers

et al. 2020

Language, Cognition and Neuroscience

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We investigated whether the phonological co-activation of alternative names in picture naming (e.g. "fish" for target "shark") is reduced by contextual constraints which render them inappropriate. In the constraining context, the target naming response was preceded by a naming response to an object from the same category (e.g., an eel) which remained visible during target naming. Therefore, use of the alternative target name "fish" would result (a) in an ambiguous response because of the visual context and (b) in a pragmatically odd response because of the previous naming response. In Experiment 1 the context pictures were named by the participants themselves and in Experiment 2 by a communication partner. In both experiments, interference from distractor words phonologically related ("finger") versus unrelated ("book") to the alternative name was observed regardless of context. This finding indicates limited flexibility in lexical activation during speech planning.

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Interference in joint picture naming.

Cited by 29 publications

References 55 publications

Spontaneous adaptation explains why people act faster when being imitated

Spontaneous adaptation explains why people act faster when being imitated

Mental representations of partner task cause interference in picture naming

Pragmatic constraints do not prevent the co-activation of alternative names: evidence from sequential naming tasks with one and two speakers

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