Interest groups and political parties in Italian agricultural policy: powerful farmers with and without parties

Lizzi, Renata

doi:10.1080/23248823.2014.965031

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Structural changes in the economy and in the labor market impacted voters' preferences and severely undermined the relationship between trade unions and social democratic parties (Kitschelt 1994; Wallerstein & Western 2000). The shrinking agricultural sector eroded ties between associations of farmers and conservative and agrarian parties (von Beyme 1985, Lizzi 2014). This put into motion a shift from mass‐parties, which represented predefined social groups, to a “catch‐all” competition, where parties sought to attract as large a portion of the electorate as possible (Kirchheimer 1966).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How parties and interest groups protect their ties: The case of lobbying laws

Crepaz

2020

Regulation & Governance

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Scholars have recently shown renewed interest in the study of party-interest group ties. According to previous studies, traditional ties between parties and organized interest are a matter of the past. Globalization, deindustrialization, and neoliberalism have posed serious challenges to their survival. Recent contributions suggest that, while these ties are indeed weaker than before, they have not disappeared. How do parties and groups protect their ties? This paper attempts to provide a partial, though often neglected, answer: their relationship survives when both actors work together to protect it. While previous literature identified regulatory policies, such as ethics and transparency regulations, as detrimental to party-group ties, their introduction is erroneously treated as independent from these ties. Through a comparative case study of the introduction of lobbying laws in Austria, Australia, and Ireland, this paper suggests that parties and groups shape the content of lobbying regulations in such a way to protect their relationship.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How parties and interest groups protect their ties: The case of lobbying laws

Crepaz

2020

Regulation & Governance

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Greening the CAP from Farm to Fork: Roots of Italy's Resistance to the Process of Reform

Maneschi

2023

EuroChoices

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SummaryMany Member States and diverse stakeholders continue to present conservative positions in the CAP reform process to enhance environmental sustainability. During the last process of reform, the Italian Ministry of Agriculture favoured the maintenance of the status quo of the payments, minimising environmental ambitions. Behind this positioning there is a powerful farmers’ organisation – Coldiretti – that has a major political role in the Italian context. Coldiretti and the Ministry have built a historical bloc which exercises a hegemonic power in the Italian agricultural policy‐network. On the other side, the coalition Cambiamo Agricultura, mobilising for the greening of the CAP and for an agroecological transition, is highly marginalised. However, changes in the power equilibria could emerge and the coalition Cambiamo Agricoltura could potentially have a major role in this transition. It could strengthen its visibility in the national media; inform civil society and reinforce the consensus in public opinion for a transition in the agricultural sector; it could also open a direct dialogue and collaboration with Coldiretti, promoting the integration of ambitious environmental objectives within the discourse of the main farmers’ organisation itself. The result would be inclusion of the actors for transition within the decision‐making process, resulting in greener positions for the next CAP reform.

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