How parties and interest groups protect their ties: The case of lobbying laws

Abstract

Scholars have recently shown renewed interest in the study of party-interest group ties. According to previous studies, traditional ties between parties and organized interest are a matter of the past. Globalization, deindustrialization, and neoliberalism have posed serious challenges to their survival. Recent contributions suggest that, while these ties are indeed weaker than before, they have not disappeared. How do parties and groups protect their ties? This paper attempts to provide a partial, though often neglected, answer: their relationship survives when both actors work together to protect it. While previous literature identified regulatory policies, such as ethics and transparency regulations, as detrimental to party-group ties, their introduction is erroneously treated as independent from these ties. Through a comparative case study of the introduction of lobbying laws in Austria, Australia, and Ireland, this paper suggests that parties and groups shape the content of lobbying regulations in such a way to protect their relationship.

How did the disclosure of lobbying targeting Quebec's hospitals become mandatory and with what effect?

“…On the other hand, the case study findings seem to cohere with studies showing that politicians tend to symbolically support change when it is not too constraining for them (Courty & Milet, 2018; Crepaz, 2021; Lowery & Gray, 1997; Veksler, 2016). The status quo actors never spoke out openly against greater transparency for lobbying activities targeting mega‐hospitals.…”

“…Second, other theories posit that politicians’ attitudes and behaviour towards lobbying regulation result from strategic calculations. Anglo‐Saxon and French studies on the regulation of lobbying suggest that politicians will support a change to the extent that it allows them to make a symbolic gain without harming their interests (Courty & Milet, 2018; Crepaz, 2021; Lowery & Gray, 1997; Veksler, 2016). This theoretical perspective helps us understand why politicians have approved changes that are not constraining for them and for the lobbyists with whom they work.…”

Explaining the German lobbying register law and its reform: combining insights from the Multiple Streams Framework and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

“…Other dynamics include policy diffusion and learning in the context of a 'new wave of strong lobbying regulation' (Holman and Luneburg 2012;De Francesco 2021) following the EU's example. Moreover, a favorable political culture, e.g., of legislative transparency, corporatist traditions or strong ties between government parties and interest groups even in absence of formal regulation (Miller and Dinan 2008;Crepaz 2016Crepaz , 2021McKay and Wozniak 2020;Korkea-aho 2021) as well as domestic political pressure (Ozymy 2010;Newmark 2017) can lead to stricter laws. Therefore, scandals alone are insufficient in explaining policy change in transparency regulation.…”

“…Contrary to stereotypical believes, the German lobbyists association (de'ge'pol) has been a central actor of the community demanding stricter rules for its industry, complementary to findings that interest groups actively welcome lobbying regulation. While it may appear counterintuitive for lobbyists to demand transparency and public scrutiny that could limit their scope of action, research (Crepaz 2021;Holman and Luneburg 2012;Chari et al 2019;Bunea 2018;Crepaz 2021) has outlined the reasons for this. These include the ability to evaluate competition and cooperation among other interest groups, assess the dynamics between political parties and interest groups, as well as to pursue the objective of improving reputation.…”

Measuring the effects of electronic government services and corrupt practices on information exchange: a comparison of public and private hospitals

“…However, corruption, also defined as the abuse of public office for private gain, hinders public services (Huther and Shah, 1997). In corrupt nations, public service providers often receive inadequate compensation, which leads to low motivation to improve service delivery and hinders engagement in HIE (Crepaz, 2021). Corruption has been observed to hinder sustainable healthcare services in a country by paralyzing policy-making and administration services (Ahmed and Abbas, 2022).…”