2019
DOI: 10.1177/1532673x19875695
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Interest Group and Political Party Influence on Growth in State Spending and Debt

Abstract: Does more lobbying by more interest groups, especially groups representing a state’s largest business sector, lead to greater spending and debt? Or does the blame really rest with state lawmakers and their political parties, which compete to attract and retain the allegiance of these powerful organized interests so they can win control of state government? We test this question with data on annual state budgets from 2006 to 2015, the number of interest groups in each state for those years, the size of the cons… Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Jie sukuria prielaidas priimamų sprendimų racionalumui, politikos viešumui bei valdžios institucijų informuotumui. Užsienio šalių mokslininkai organizuotų interesų samprata dažnai vartoja kaip sinonimą interesų grupių sampratai (Holyoke, Cummins (2020); Berkhout ir kt. (2018); Djupe, Lewis (2015); Francia (2010); Michael (2006); Lindblom, Woodhouse (1999); Caldeira, Wright (1988), Gable (1957) ir kt.…”
Section: įVadasunclassified
“…Jie sukuria prielaidas priimamų sprendimų racionalumui, politikos viešumui bei valdžios institucijų informuotumui. Užsienio šalių mokslininkai organizuotų interesų samprata dažnai vartoja kaip sinonimą interesų grupių sampratai (Holyoke, Cummins (2020); Berkhout ir kt. (2018); Djupe, Lewis (2015); Francia (2010); Michael (2006); Lindblom, Woodhouse (1999); Caldeira, Wright (1988), Gable (1957) ir kt.…”
Section: įVadasunclassified
“…In their account, government awards additional selective benefits as additional groups mobilize. Similarly, Holyoke and Cummins (2020) argue that interest groups push state governments to spend more and accrue more debt, particularly for selective benefits. Still others suggest that groups extract benefits via regulatory capture (e.g., Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971).…”
Section: Government Growth and Interest Populationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similar analyses have neglected the revolution because of limited datasets. By examining cross-sections of states starting in 1975, or yearly observations from the past decade, other studies generally find no or conditional relationships between lawmaking or government spending, and lobbying (e.g., Boehmke 2005; Holyoke and Cummins 2020; Lowery and Gray 1998; Strickland 2019b). These studies miss a pivotal time in the states, and their findings are at odds with studies of congressional lobbying.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The studies in the literature generally determine that pressure and interest groups have a positive effect on the public sector size (McCormick & Tollison, 1981;Mueller & Murrell, 1986;Fiorino & Ricciuti, 2009;Yamamura, 2012). The relationship among variables in the studies like the ones of Bacot and Dawes (1986), Gray and Lowery (1988), Newmark and Witko (2007), Randolph and Tasto (2012), and Holyoke and Cummins (2019), determine that interest groups have a positive effect on public expenditures in the USA for the period 2006-2015. Similarly, Randolph and Tasto (2012) conducted a spatial analysis for the states within the USA and reached the conclusion that public expenditures are crucial in the formation of special interest groups through states.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%