2020
DOI: 10.1177/1065912920975490
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A Quiet Revolution in State Lobbying: Government Growth and Interest Populations

Abstract: What explains contemporary numbers of interest groups in America? To answer this question and help address conflicting narratives in research, I examine the rise of interest groups in the states. Assembling an original dataset based on archival and secondary sources, I find that relatively few groups lobbied legislators prior to the 1960s or 1970s. During those decades, numbers of interest groups began to grow rapidly. I find that increases in lawmaking activities present inconsistent effects on the political … Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 57 publications
(62 reference statements)
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“…Writing partly in response to this body of research, other scholars have examined the demographic or institutional contexts that allow for more or less lobbying by organized interests, and the resulting effects on interest diversity. For example, there are more interests with registered lobbyists in larger states (Lowery & Gray, 1995) with citizen legislatures (Berkman, 2001), direct democracy (Boehmke, 2005), and more state spending (Strickland, 2020b). Direct democracy spurs more citizen interests in particular into mobilizing.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Writing partly in response to this body of research, other scholars have examined the demographic or institutional contexts that allow for more or less lobbying by organized interests, and the resulting effects on interest diversity. For example, there are more interests with registered lobbyists in larger states (Lowery & Gray, 1995) with citizen legislatures (Berkman, 2001), direct democracy (Boehmke, 2005), and more state spending (Strickland, 2020b). Direct democracy spurs more citizen interests in particular into mobilizing.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…I include a measure of overall spending on the legislature since Berkman (2001) finds that there are fewer interests in states with more resource-rich assemblies. I use a measure of overall government spending in real dollars since Strickland (2020b) finds a discernible correlation between spending and lobbying. I include measures of overall policy liberalism (from Caughey & Warshaw, 2015) and innovativeness (from Boehmke & Skinner, 2012) since these measures might predict organization totals in post-1970s years.…”
Section: Three Synthetic Control Analysesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In response, state legislatures began to regulate lobbying activities (Strickland, 2021). Massachusetts, one of the states most connected to the early development of associational life (Brown, 1974), set the benchmark by passing a lobbyist registration law in 1890.…”
Section: Associations and Lobbying State Governmentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The practice spread, resulting in 20 states requiring some form of lobbyist registration by 1927. These states were primarily located in the Northeast and Midwest (Strickland, 2021). When registering with state officials, lobbyists were required to provide both their names and the names of the interests they represented.…”
Section: Lobbyist Registration Formsmentioning
confidence: 99%