Interessenvermittlung in der Europäischen Union

Eising, Rainer

doi:10.1007/978-3-322-86687-5_20

Cited by 9 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Trenz 2004). In the context of the discussion of the European democratic deficit, the EU aimed to create a framework for participation of civil society groups in the 1990s (Eising 2012). Furthermore, EU-level civil society organisations have received financial support from the EU (Eising 2012, 842).…”

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

Three Models of the European Public Sphere

Walter

2015

Journalism Studies

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While previous research has taken into account different normative theories when examining the concept of the public sphere at the national level, the underlying normative conceptualisation of the European public sphere has often remained vague. However, better understanding whether the European public sphere is functional and able to fulfil its democratic role needs further specification of the underlying normative criteria. This study considers different normative public sphere theories in the context of the European Union (EU) news coverage. Specifically, it focuses on one main criterion, namely the actor structure, and examines which normative theory is able to describe the actor structure of the EU best. The visibility of national and European governmental actors, civil society actors and citizens is examined by drawing on secondary data of a large-scale content analysis of television and newspaper articles of all 27 EU member states gathered during the 2009 European Parliament election campaign (N = 12,850).KEYWORDS content analysis; democratic theory; EU news; European public sphere Journalism Studies, 2015 http://dx.

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Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 99%

Three Models of the European Public Sphere

Walter

2015

Journalism Studies

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“…(Note 9) Due to the Commission's limited resources and the complexities involved in creating regulation for 28 member countries, the Commission regularly asks for input and invites especially business representatives to contribute to working groups and committees if not the drafting of regulatory proposals (Eising, 2001), a process that contributes to the development of clientilist relationships (Nollert, 1997). (Note 10) In consequence, scholars consider the interests and views of business lobby groups to be deeply embedded within the Commission (Coen, 2007).…”

Section: Non-state Actors In Eu Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Passing the Scepter, not the Buck Long Arms in EU Climate Politics

Fuchs¹,

Feldhoff²

2016

JSD

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This paper investigates power dynamics between and within the core institutions of the European Union (EU) in the development of the 2030 EU climate & energy framework. Starting from the widely studied change in the EU's climate policy from "leadership by example" to "slow motion", it integrates a specific focus on power dynamics between the core EU institutions and non-state actors. Interestingly, perspectives on power relations between and within EU institutions and the power of non-state actors in EU governance are rarely integrated explicitly in analyses of the EU's shift in its stance on climate policy. In this article, we aim to draw together the analyses of institutional power dynamics in EU climate policy with analyses of the exercise of power by non-state actors to explain the dynamics leading to the change in EU climate politics. Using data from document research, secondary literature and interviews conducted with members of EU institutions as well as non-state actors, we show that an absence of clear leadership from the European Council in the end furthered an extended influence of business actors via the strengthening of the Commission as well as particular DGs. The results show how inadequate guidance from the Council and divisions within the Commission facilitated the informal passing of the scepter of EU climate policy to business, even as EU institutions retained formal responsibility, thus not passing the buck in a corresponding manner. The analysis further reveals strong reasons for doubt towards future EU ambitions in global climate change politics.

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Repräsentation Ohne Demokratie

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Interessenvermittlung in der Europäischen Union

Cited by 9 publications

References 13 publications

Three Models of the European Public Sphere

Three Models of the European Public Sphere

Passing the Scepter, not the Buck Long Arms in EU Climate Politics

Bibliographie

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