Passing the Scepter, not the Buck Long Arms in EU Climate Politics

Abstract

This paper investigates power dynamics between and within the core institutions of the European Union (EU) in the development of the 2030 EU climate & energy framework. Starting from the widely studied change in the EU's climate policy from "leadership by example" to "slow motion", it integrates a specific focus on power dynamics between the core EU institutions and non-state actors. Interestingly, perspectives on power relations between and within EU institutions and the power of non-state actors in EU governance are rarely integrated explicitly in analyses of the EU's shift in its stance on climate policy. In this article, we aim to draw together the analyses of institutional power dynamics in EU climate policy with analyses of the exercise of power by non-state actors to explain the dynamics leading to the change in EU climate politics. Using data from document research, secondary literature and interviews conducted with members of EU institutions as well as non-state actors, we show that an absence of clear leadership from the European Council in the end furthered an extended influence of business actors via the strengthening of the Commission as well as particular DGs. The results show how inadequate guidance from the Council and divisions within the Commission facilitated the informal passing of the scepter of EU climate policy to business, even as EU institutions retained formal responsibility, thus not passing the buck in a corresponding manner. The analysis further reveals strong reasons for doubt towards future EU ambitions in global climate change politics.

Windows of Opportunity for Whom? Commissioners, Access, and the Balance of Interest in European Environmental Governance

“…Indeed, the Juncker Commission (2014-2019) is probably the primary example for regulatory capture in the EU and thereby also a major contributor to rising Euroscepticism . The priority it attaches to growth and competitiveness, its reduction in the number of Commissioners with environmental portfolios as well as in the influence of DG Environment, which interviewees noted, is clearly detrimental to sustainability objectives (Delreux and Happaerts 2016;Fuchs and Feldhoff 2016;Steinebach and Knill 2016). Thus, reeling in business influence is highly necessary in terms of popular support for the EU as much as in terms of the sustainability challenges facing humankind.…”

“…In consequence, it is not surprising that DG MARE traditionally is heavily influenced if not captured by the fisheries lobby. For the case of climate policy, scholars have documented a similarly strong role that the European industry plays as a stakeholder and lobbyist (Boasson and Wettestad 2013;Fuchs and Feldhoff 2016). This is partly due to the breadth of industrial sectors involved and especially to the role of traditional national champions as well as core motivations behind European integration in the form of the energy, coal, steel and car industries.…”

“…Still, these conflicts among business interests did not translate into an absence of business in the lobbying process. On the contrary, both individual companies as well as industry associations tried to exercise extensive pressure both at the Commission and the Parliament, as interviewees indicated (see also Fagan-Watson et al 2015;Fuchs and Feldhoff 2016;Ydersbond 2016).…”

“…He argued for a lower GHG reduction target and especially nonbinding targets for renewables (Bürgin 2015). In this context, Oettinger proved particularly accessible to business interests, as interviewees stated, and NGO and media inquiries have documented close ties between Oettinger and the German car industry as well as large energy utilities, and the oil industry (in particular BP) (Fuchs and Feldhoff 2016;Hall 2012;Neslen 2016). In framing the issue, Oettinger argued that Europe is at a "competitive disadvantage" due to its "reluctance to take risks on offshore oil drilling and tar sands" and its "failure to fully explore its shale gas options" (Neslen 2012).…”

Wipeout? entrepreneurship, policy interaction and the EU’s 2030 renewable energy target

“…Existing explanations for the general outcome of the 2030 targets centre on the importance among non-state actors, especially business interests and the actions of specific, powerful pro-business EU officials, as well as mixed political signals from the member states and a divided Commission (Bürgin 2015;Fuchs and Feldhoff 2016;Ydersbond 2016). However, we argue below that these explanations do not fully account for the muted support for multiple targets among non-state actors, or the impact of the EU-ETS reform process on actors that were lobbying both briefs at the same time.…”