Interaction of high power electromagnetic pulses with power cables and electronic systems

Kichouliya, Rakesh; Thomas, M. Joy

doi:10.1109/isemc.2016.7571636

Cited by 13 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Можливості функціонального придушення і ФУ РЕС обговорюються в [3,6,[12][13][14][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30]. У роботах [31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38] описано вплив потужних електромагнітних імпульсів на радіоелектронні пристрої, а в [39]на комп'ютери.…”

Section: âñòóïunclassified

Functional Damage of Radio Electronic Systems

Черногор

2021

Radio phys. radio astron.

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Purpose: The most important problem of any state is protection of the control and management systems used for the country, national armed forces, high-risk facilities (nuclear power plants, large chemical plants, airports, etc.). Here, the fact that the means of attack can be deployed on ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft, and drones should be accounted for. The flight altitude of these vehicles varies from ≈300 km to ≈ 10 m. Any attack vehicle is equipped with complex avionics consisting of circuit elements sensitive to electromagnetic fields. Since the 1980s, a new scientific and engineering direction has been developing, being termed as a “functional damage to avionics”. It is based on the creation of powerful means of electromagnetic radiation possessing the energetic capabilities of incapacitating avionics at significant distances (from ~ 100 m to ~ 1000 km). The purpose of this work is to analyze the possible functional damage to avionics with account for the tendencies in avionics technologies. Design/methodology/approach: The analysis is made on the capability of inflicting functional damage to avionics accounting for the modern trends in developing the powerful means of electromagnetic energy generation in the microwave and shorter wavelength ranges, miniaturization and integration of avionics circuit elements. The regression is constructed for the critical energy time dependence. It has been determined that for decades the critical energy required to damage the circuit elements shows a tendency to decrease. This is due to the further miniaturization and integration of microcircuits according to the Moore’s law, which is still valid for now. For a number of circuit elements, the critical energy is found to be in the range of 10-11–10-10 J. At the same time, a reverse tendency arises to protect avionics from being functionally damaged. In this case, the critical energy makes 10-7–10-6 J and greater. From the derived version of the basic equation of functional damage to avionics, the maximum distance at which the damage is possible with the energetics of the existing radio systems is estimated. For the ground-based facilities, this distance can attain hundreds of kilometers. For mobile vehicles, it can reach 10–100 km. Combining target detection, identification and avionics damage capabilities in one radio system has been validated and advised. The transition from the first mode of operation to the second one occurs at shorter distances with an increase of 2–3 orders of magnitude in the pulse energy. Findings: The regression equation has been obtained for the time dependence of the critical energy required for inflicting functional damage to avionics. Its constant decrease has been confirmed. Such a behavior is closely related to the Moore’s law, which characterizes the degree of miniaturization and integration of avionics circuit elements. It has been predicted that for a number of instruments the critical energy can be smaller than 10-11–10-10 J. A version of the basic equation of functional damage to avionics has been obtained. The maximum distance for a modern radio system to damage the avionics has been shown to attain many hundreds of kilometers. For the radio systems installed on mobile vehicles, this distance makes 10–100 km. Target detection, tracking and identification, as well as avionics damage capabilities, have been proved to be rationally combined in one radio system. To cause damage at a corresponding range, the pulse energy needs to be increased by a factor of 102–103. Conclusions: There are all science and technology prerequisites for developing effective radio systems inflicting functional damage to avionics and for the state defense and protection, armed forces, and high-risk facility controlling systems. Key words: functional damage; avionics; critical energy; Moore’s law; functional damage equation; radiolocation equation; detection and destruction range

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Section: âñòóïunclassified

Functional Damage of Radio Electronic Systems

Черногор

2021

Radio phys. radio astron.

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“…The proper number of the repeated illuminations in one test status should be selected with a consideration of both p CL and cost. From the above analysis, the number of the repeated illuminations should be selected in the region of [3,7]. In this region, the confidence level is 81.3-92.2%, which is commonly sufficient for use.…”

Section: Confidence Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Electronic components and circuits, such as transistor [1,2], microcontroller [3], and amplifier circuit [4], are vulnerable under the high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) environment. Thus, communication [5], radar [6], and electronic systems [7] can be temporarily upset or permanently damaged by HEMP. Many civil and military systems face the threat of the HEMP environment [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Confidence Level of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Field Tests

Zhu¹,

Yang²,

Shi³

et al. 2019

PIER Letters

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High-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) field tests are conducted in the working volume of HEMP simulators to verify the hardness or HEMP survivability of the systems under test. For HEMP field tests, enough confidence should be provided through certain specific test designs. In this paper, the confidence probability of HEMP field tests is defined through a statistical analysis. Based on this definition, the confidence level of the tests is proposed to address the problem that the probability of a failure or significant upset is unknown. The relation between the number of repeated illuminations in one test status and confidence level is provided after analysis. By balancing cost and confidence level, an appropriate number of the repeated illuminations for each test status can be obtained. The comparison with the definition in another article is also made.

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“…This is because the power line for supplying the internal equipment is connected to the outside. Moreover, there are vents for internal ventilation [5,6]. Therefore, an electronic attack can affect the equipment in the electronic protection facilities, and various studies are being conducted to reduce them.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improved Active Interference Canceling Algorithms for Real-Time Protection of 2nd/3rd Level Facilities in Electronic Warfare Environment

et al. 2020

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In an electronic warfare environment, important equipment or facilities of the friendlies are placed in protective facilities to protect against external Electronic Attacks (EA). No matter how well shielded the facility is, some external electromagnetic waves may penetrate through various paths such as power lines or fans, and the electromagnetic waves may be fatal to certain devices due to the structural resonance of the protective facilities. This paper introduced a real-time electromagnetic canceling technique that removes the resonance field inside the protection facility caused by the intended electronic attack from the enemy. The method makes it possible to cancel the process much faster than the conventional ones that have applied the Matrix Pencil Method (MPM). This is because the internal resonant field can be predicted in a closed-form under the assumption that the external electromagnetic wave is a complex exponential function. Longer exposure to Intended Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) could be fatal for some devices. Therefore, it is imperative to attenuate the noise within a short time, and a method of reducing internal noise in real-time is beneficial for Electronic Protection (EP). The proposed method could be applied as a new technique to protect important protection facilities, rather than the more traditional method called wrapping using the Faraday cage effect.

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Interaction of high power electromagnetic pulses with power cables and electronic systems

Cited by 13 publications

References 2 publications

Functional Damage of Radio Electronic Systems

Functional Damage of Radio Electronic Systems

Confidence Level of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Field Tests

Improved Active Interference Canceling Algorithms for Real-Time Protection of 2nd/3rd Level Facilities in Electronic Warfare Environment

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