Inter-institutional Rules and Division of Power in the European Parliament: Allocation of Consultation and Co-decision Reports

Abstract

Studies on the European Parliament have largely overlooked the impact of the interinstitutional context on its internal organisation. This paper argues that the stronger legislative powers of the Parliament vis-a`-vis the Council of Ministers under the codecision than under the consultation procedure affect the intra-parliamentary allocation of different types of legislative report. The analysis of the period 2004-07 shows that legislators from the centre-right party group coalition and loyal party group members are privileged in the allocation of co-decision reports. In contrast, legislators with outlying special interests and experts are given systematic access to drafting only consultation reports. The higher competition for co-decision versus consultation reports left unchecked by the formal EP rules has thus been exploited by party group leaders to promote group cohesion and coalition-building, producing clear winners and losers.

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