Is informal politics undemocratic? Trilogues, early agreements and the selection model of representation

Abstract

Over the last two decades, the European Parliament (EP) has been empowered to make European Union (EU) legislation more inclusive, transparent and accountable. Yet, co-legislation has increased informalization and seclusion, as an ever-larger proportion of legislative acts is pre-agreed between Parliament and Council prior to first reading. This article asks under which conditions informalization is democratically problematic or tenable. So far, 'early agreements' have been criticized for their lack of transparency and accountability, their challenge to deliberation and inclusiveness, and their differential empowerment of 'relais actors'. Little attention has been paid, however, to the representation of the parliamentary principal in trilogues. This article draws on Jane Mansbridge's selection model of representation to fill the gap; it argues that representation with a strong 'selection core' and a weak 'sanction periphery' is, prudentially, best-suited for bicameral bargaining, and it introduces normative standards that make the selection model democratically tenable. A close analysis of codecision's current practices and institutions shows that these fall short of 'good deliberation at initial selection' and of 'narrative accountability'; 'ease of maintenance and de-selection' is approximated and 'transparency in rationale' is strengthened in the EP's 2012 Rules of Procedure. Future reform should, therefore, introduce two democratically crucial, yet hitherto neglected, measures: open deliberation about the appointment of rapporteurs; and reason-giving and justification (in addition to reporting back) by trilogue negotiators.

The European Parliament as a developing legislature: coming of age in trilogues?

“…They can be defined as informal inter-institutional negotiations bringing together the representatives of the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission. While facilitating early agreements between EU decision-makers, trilogues have been regarded as an opaque and unaccountable form of decisionmaking (Farrell and Héritier 2004;Héritier and Reh 2012;Rasmussen and Reh 2013;Reh 2014), drawing the EP into 'responsible' law-making and commercial diplomacy (Jacqué 2009 In sum, puzzling evidence and rising controversies over trilogues beg the question anew of what kind of a parliament the EP is, what political significance it has in EU politics, and how it contributes to the maintenance of an EU political order. Exploring the nature and political significance of the EP requires that we pay more systematic attention to the institutionalization of legislative procedures in the EP.…”

Designing a Collective Agent for Trilogues in the European Parliament

“…By changing the composition of the agents, the reforms have allowed the latter to increase their discretion (Reh 2014;Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood 2017). Interviews confirm that decisions on trilogue compromises are often taken "in just the small teams" (Interview E) and thus without intervention of the committee.…”

“…With all the political groups being present in the collective agent, the information asymmetry between them decreases, and this gives the opportunity to the different political positions to be heard in the negotiation (Reh 2014). This motivation to protect the balance of power within the EP was first officially expressed in 2001 by the Vice-Presidents of the EP who warned against two dangers of trilogue negotiations: the "reduced opportunities for wider societal and political interests to introduce their points of view into the decision making process" and the reduction in the "open and public debate in the plenary with the full participation of all political groups and members" (Imbeni et al 2001: 2).…”

Free Trade versus Democracy and Social Standards in the European Union: Trade-Offs or Trilemma?

“…In trilogues, parliamentary committees and also the plenary are involved from the beginning to the end. The problem is one of weights and substance: if the most decisive part of the legislative process is carried out behind closed doors by experts in non-transparent negotiation circles, democratic accountability is reduced even if in the end parliament and its committees are involved just as they should be formally and legally (Reh, 2014;Roederer-Rynning & Greenwood, 2015. Trilogues dedemocratise and de-politicize decision-making in the EU.…”