Intentional Vagueness

Blume, Andreas; Board, Oliver

doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9468-x

Cited by 50 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…In his paper, as inBlume and Board (2009), the focus is on the strategic use of an existing vague language, as opposed to the question of why language is vague that is raised byLipman (2009).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games

Blume

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

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confidence: 99%

A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games

Blume

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…Lipman (2009) argues that one needs a model of bounded rationality to explain the use of vague terms in natural language. Board (2009) andDe Jaegher (2003) show that communication with a vague language may mitigate conflict and thus increase welfare. Finally, Serra-Garcia, van Damme, and Potters (2011) experimentally study communication between leaders and followers in sequential public good games.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs

Agranov

Schotter

2012

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimentally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague manner. (JEL C71, D81, D83)

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“…conventional meaning and conversational practices. Beyond blind cooperation, some see a role for egocentric motives, argumentation and non-cooperative linguistic behavior as well (e.g., Anscom-bre and Ducrot 1983;Merin 1999;Rubinstein 2000;de Jaegher 2003;Blume and Board 2014;de Jaegher and van Rooij 2014). Be that as it may, we believe that the purpose of use that explains different pragmatic phenomena can be different.…”

Section: Rationalisticmentioning

confidence: 93%

Probabilistic pragmatics, or why Bayes’ rule is probably important for pragmatics

Franke

Jäger

2016

Zeitschrift Für Sprachwissenschaft

123

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Probabilistic pragmatics aspires to explain certain regularities of language use and interpretation as behavior of speakers and listeners who want to satisfy their conversational interests in a context that may contain a substantial amount of uncertainty. This approach differs substantially from more familiar approaches in theoretical pragmatics. To set it apart, we here work out some of its key distinguishing features and show, by way of some simple examples, how probabilistic pragmatics instantiates these.

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Intentional Vagueness

Cited by 50 publications

References 32 publications

A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games

A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games

Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs

Probabilistic pragmatics, or why Bayes’ rule is probably important for pragmatics

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