A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games

Blume, Andreas

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.008

“…Let us set L = L 1 and A = A 2 , and let us consider a correlation device as above, which selects communication equilibrium payoff (even not in SINTIR( )) can be achieved as a correlated equilibrium payoff of the cheap talk game. As already pointed out, Blume (2010) proves an analog in Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model.…”

Section: Sender-receiver Gamessupporting

confidence: 60%

“…One stage of cheap talk suffices then to implement all communication equilibrium outcomes. Recently, Blume (2010) established a similar result in the context of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) sender-receiver game. 5 Forges's (1985) construction goes through if payoff relevant actions are added for the single informed player.…”

Section: Can All Canonical Communication Equilibrium Outcomes Be Implmentioning

confidence: 68%

“…What do we really gain from our construction? As argued by Forges (1985Forges ( , 1988Forges ( , 1990b) and recently by Blume (2010), the mediators implicitly involved in the two solution concepts are very different from each other. In a (canonical) communication equilibrium of the original game, the mediator gets to know the whole information of every player.…”

Section: Can All Canonical Communication Equilibrium Outcomes Be Implmentioning

confidence: 98%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

Vida

¹

,

Forges

²

2013

Theoretical Economics

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“…6 With λ > 0, "talk is not cheap" in our model. Chen (2011) introduces exogenous preference for honesty to a cheap talk model; Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) and Kartik (2009) introduce lying costs into cheap talk models.…”

mentioning

confidence: 92%

“…6 A higher value of λ means that the respondent is more lying averse, i.e., he has a stronger preference for truth-telling. Similarly, a more stigmatization averse respondent will have a higher ξ.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response

Blume

¹

,

Lai

²

,

Lim

³

2013

Self Cite

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The paper formalizes Warner's (1965) randomized response technique (RRT) as a game and implements it experimentally, thus linking game theoretic approaches to randomness in communication with survey practice in the field and a novel implementation in the lab. As predicted by our model and in line with Warner, the frequency of truthful responses is significantly higher with randomization than without. The model predicts that randomization weakly improves information elicitation, as measured in terms of mutual information, although, surprisingly, not always by RRT inducing truth-telling. Contrary to this prediction, randomization significantly reduces the elicited information in our experiment.Keywords: Randomized Response; Lying Aversion; Stigmatization Aversion; Mutual Information; Laboratory Experiments JEL classification: C72; C92; D82; D83 * We are grateful to Joel Sobel for valuable comments and suggestions. For helpful comments and discussions, we thank seminar participants at

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Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response

Blume

¹

,

Lai

²

,

Lim

³

2019

Games and Economic Behavior

Self Cite

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The paper formalizes Warner's (1965) randomized response technique (RRT) as a game and implements it experimentally, thus linking game theoretic approaches to randomness in communication with survey practice in the field and a novel implementation in the lab. As predicted by our model and in line with Warner, the frequency of truthful responses is significantly higher with randomization than without. The model predicts that randomization weakly improves information elicitation, as measured in terms of mutual information, although, surprisingly, not always by RRT inducing truth-telling. Contrary to this prediction, randomization significantly reduces the elicited information in our experiment.

show abstract

A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games

Cited by 14 publications

References 19 publications

Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response

Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response

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