2005
DOI: 10.1080/13571510500299029
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Intellectual Property Rights and the Organization of Industries: New Perspectives in Law and Economics

Abstract: The process of innovation usually differs from one industry to another, according to level of expected rents, the uncertainty over the return of investments and competition dynamics. The diversity of industries is largely reflected not only in their rate of innovation and growth, but also in the evolution of their governance structures. Notwithstanding the pervasive diversity of the organization of industries, the legal protection accorded by IPRs has evolved as a standard rule that grants the same protection … Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…In our opinion, Gulman's view-which seems to have re-flourished in the IMS decision-ignores the fact that other forms of liability rules rewarding owners of intellectual property rights are still available, in addition to property rules (e.g. veto power over third party access rights) that can produce a monopolistic configuration in the downstream market (Nicita, Ramello & Scherer, 2005). In other words, since the application of the essential facility access principle forces the creation of a wholesale market, in order to reward innovative effort it is sufficient to define a wholesale price that fully compensates owners while eliminating all discrimination in the downstream market between the incumbent and new entrants.…”
Section: Property Rule Market Power and Defensive Leveragingmentioning
confidence: 95%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In our opinion, Gulman's view-which seems to have re-flourished in the IMS decision-ignores the fact that other forms of liability rules rewarding owners of intellectual property rights are still available, in addition to property rules (e.g. veto power over third party access rights) that can produce a monopolistic configuration in the downstream market (Nicita, Ramello & Scherer, 2005). In other words, since the application of the essential facility access principle forces the creation of a wholesale market, in order to reward innovative effort it is sufficient to define a wholesale price that fully compensates owners while eliminating all discrimination in the downstream market between the incumbent and new entrants.…”
Section: Property Rule Market Power and Defensive Leveragingmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…the refusal by a dominant firm to provide access to a copyrighted entitlement, representing an essential facility for entering downstream markets, may be considered an abuse of dominant position, thus sanctioned by antitrust law, in the form of a 'defensive leveraging' strategy aimed at preserving dominant firm's market power (Cooper Feldman, 1999). In recent years, a growing number of antitrust decisions in the U.S. 10 and Europe 11 have addressed the issue of potential ex-post monopolization or abuse of dominant position in industrial sectors characterized by intellectual property right based essential facilities (Ramello, 2003(Ramello, , 2005Heimler & Nicita, 2004;Nicita, Ramello & Scherer, 2005). These decisions show that the overlap between antitrust and intellectual property laws is far from resolved, and some boundaries need to be drawn between various provisions.…”
Section: Property Rule Market Power and Defensive Leveragingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Technological convergence appears when two or more distinguishable technologies combine (Schnaars et al, 2008). This process, technological convergence, features intense dynamics and it provides various ways to create new competitive opportunities where different variables become significant (Nicita et al, 2005).…”
Section: Technological Convergencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Intellectual property rights are at source a legal monopoly, which does not necessarily translate into an economic monopoly (Anderson, 1998). Nevertheless, the prospect of an economic monopoly and its attendant supra‐profits gives right‐holders a strong incentive to adopt any behaviour that can enhance the (real or perceived) uniqueness of the product, making it poorly substitutable and so securing significant market power (Lunney, 1999; Nicita et al , 2005; Ramello, 2005).…”
Section: Distinctiveness and Market Structurementioning
confidence: 99%