Integrated Performance Measurement as a Strategic Management Accounting Approach: A Case of Beverage Businesses in Thailand

This study aims to find empirical evidence of causal relationship between strategy type, market orientation, strategic management accounting (SMA) strategic costing technique, and financial sector performance of private universities in Indonesia. The research object in this study are private universities in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Yogyakarta is chosen because universities there are one of the barometers of higher education in Indonesia, and the city has quite a number of universities. The respondents in this study are the leader (manager) of private universities in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The data analysis is done using SEM-PLS with WarpPLS 3.0 software. The results of this study show that market orientation has significant influence on the development and implementation of SMA strategic costing technique, while strategy type does not have significant influence on the development and implementation of SMA strategic costing technique. This study also finds that the implementation of SMA strategic costing technique significantly influences the financial sector performance of private universities in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. This study provides theoretical implication regarding SMA development in universities that consider that contingency factors (market orientation) can encourage increased organizational performance. It indicates support for contingency theory that states there are no general principles that apply to all situations.

Section: Hypothesis Test Results Of the Influence Sma Implementation Toward Performance Of Financial Sector Of Private Universities In Insupporting

confidence: 90%

Section: Sma Strategic Costing Techniquementioning

confidence: 99%

A Nexus among Strategy Type, Market Orientation, Strategic Costing and Financial Sector Performance of Private Universities in Indonesia

Sriyono¹

2020

“…Performance measurement defines a methodology for measuring efficiency and effectiveness and provides management with the tools to improve organizational functioning (Gajda-Lüpke, 2009). It indicates an effective performance measurement implementation by achieving the expected purpose in any task (Cinquini & Mitchell, 2005;Phornlaphatrachakorn & Peemanee, 2020).…”

Section: Performance Measurement Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Isomorphism, Human Resource Capability and Its Role in Performance Measurement and Accountability

Wulaningrum¹,

Akbar²,

Sari³

2020

This research tests the effects of institutional pressures, the use of performance measurement systems and accountability, and moderation effects of human resource capability between institutional pressures and the use of performance measurement systems in the Local Government institutions in Indonesia. The research aims to provide empirical evidence both quantitatively and qualitatively that isomorphism institutional pressures occurred in the scope of implementation of the performance measurement system and accountability in the public sector organizations and to show the importance of human resource capability enhancement in reducing external pressure impact. In addition, it tries to develop the correlation model of institutional pressures, human resource capability, implementation of the performance measurement system, and accountability of public sector organizations. The research used mixed methods with sequential explanatory design. The data collection used surveys and interviews in 209 regency/Special Region of Yogyakarta and Central Java local governments as samples. The research result indicated that the institutionalization process of the performance measurement is influenced by institutional pressures, especially coercive and mimetic pressures. Human resource capability was unable to weaken institutional pressures effects in the performance measurement system implementation. The research also proved that the use of a performance measurement system was able to improve local government institution accountability.

“…The control variables may affect the relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable so firm age (FA), and firm size (FS) are the control variables of this study (Phornlaphatrachakorn & Peemanee, 2020). Firm size is measured by total assets of the firm, which is a dummy variable (0 = total assets of the firm is below or equal to 500,000,000 baht, 1 = total assets of the firm that higher than 500,000,000 baht).…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influences of Participatory Management and Corporate Governance on the Reduction of Financial Information Asymmetry: Evidence from Thailand

Lata¹

2020

The purposes of this research were: 1) to investigate the effect of participatory management on financial information asymmetry, 2) to investigate the effect of corporate governance on financial information asymmetry, 3) to examine the influences of benefits incentives on financial information asymmetry, and 4) to test the mediating effects of benefits incentive that influences the relationship between participatory management, corporate governance, and financial information asymmetry. The research sample consisted of 388 Thai-listed firms. Data were collected through a survey questionnaire. Descriptive analysis, Multiple Regression Analysis, and Structural Equation Modeling were used for the data analysis. The results revealed: 1) participatory management and participation in evaluation had a negative influence on financial information asymmetry. 2) Corporate governance and the rights of shareholders had a negative influence on financial information asymmetry. 3) Benefits incentive was negatively associated with financial information asymmetry. 4) The model's influences of participatory management, corporate governance on the reduction of financial information asymmetry through benefits incentive as mediator fit the empirical data (Chi-square = 104.459, df = 84, p = 0.065, GFI = 0.967, RMSEA = 0.025). The variables in the model explained 78.00% and 4.70 % of the variance of benefits incentive and financial information asymmetry, respectively.