Instruments of the EU's External Democracy Promotion

Kotzian, Peter; Knodt, Michèle; Urdze, Sigita

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02163.x

Cited by 36 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Hence, we can expect the position of regional organizations to be important. First, their support can increase the success of sanctions (Crawford, , p. 205; Kotzian et al ., , p. 997). Second, when they act as norm entrepreneurs, the EU – as a supporter of multilateralism and regional integration – cannot stay behind (Manners, , pp.…”

Section: Explaining Instrumental Variation In Eu Democracy Promotion mentioning

confidence: 97%

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Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa

Biondo

2014

J of Common Market Studies

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This article investigates the causes for instrumental variation in EU democracy promotion in Africa. Can instrumental variation better be explained from a realist or from an idealist perspective? Realism would predict that sanctions are more likely in the absence of historical, security or commercial interests. Idealism would suggest that sanctions are more likely in the case of grave violations of democracy and human rights, in countries that are unstable and economically underperforming, and when there is pressure from regional organizations and domestic actors. Empirically, the article compares two cases (Guinea and Niger) where the EU imposed sanctions and two non-cases (Ethiopia and Rwanda) where the EU was reluctant to do so. Contrary to the prevalent thesis in the literature, the article finds stronger evidence for idealism (which is confirmed in all the cases) than for realism (which is only confirmed in the cases of Guinea and Ethiopia).

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Section: Explaining Instrumental Variation In Eu Democracy Promotion mentioning

confidence: 97%

“…In some cases, the EU has not gone further than rhetorical action like public statements. Such a reaction could harm diplomatic relations because of the social cost of naming and shaming (Kotzian et al ., , p. 999), but it does not impose any economic cost on the target.…”

Section: Explaining Instrumental Variation In Eu Democracy Promotion mentioning

confidence: 99%

Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa

Biondo

2014

J of Common Market Studies

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“…However, political costs are larger for political dialogue than for capacity-building because it is likely that the EU will express concerns via this instrument. Capacity-building does not inflict any material loss on the target country, nor is there any naming and shaming involved, since democracy assistance is mostly unknown to the general public and does not imply that a regime is regarded as illegitimate (Kotzian et al 2011(Kotzian et al : 1003.…”

Section: Comparing the Eu's Reactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, capacity-building is potentially politically intrusive when certain sectors are supported that may endanger the regime, including elections, the free press or human rights organisations. It is no coincidence that most EU democracy assistance in more sensitive areas is funded by the EIDHR, which is implemented without consent of the government (Kotzian et al 2011(Kotzian et al : 1003Börzel and Risse 2009: 46).…”

Section: Comparing the Eu's Reactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Norms, self-interest and effectiveness: explaining double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in Sub-Saharan Africa

Biondo

2012

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The promotion of democracy has become a key objective of the European Union (EU) in sub-Saharan Africa.One of the ways in which this objective is pursued is by reacting to violations of democratic principles using negative measures: naming and shaming strategies or economic/diplomatic sanctions. Yet the application of negative measures has been criticised as being characterised by "double standards", meaning that similar violations of democratic principles have led to a different response from the EU. This dissertation searches for explanations for these double standards. In-depth comparative studies on the motivations for double standards in the application of negative measures in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-2000 period have been lacking. While double standards have mostly been attributed to the prevalence of self-interested objectives of the EU, this dissertation considers two additional factors: (1) a potential conflict in the EU"s normative objectives (democracy, development and stability) and (2) expectations about the effectiveness of negative measures.These three explanatory factors (norms, self-interest and effectiveness) are investigated for ten case studies in sub-Saharan Africa: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Guinea, Côte d"Ivoire and Zimbabwe. It is shown that there have been double standards in the EU"s reaction to violations of democratic principles in these countries: similar violations of democratic principles have led to different reactions from the EU (positive measures, low-cost negative measures and sanctions). The motivations for these double standards are then investigated by studying the potential impact of norms, self-interest and effectiveness.On the one hand, previous studies emphasising self-interest are confirmed. Historical interests related to the desire of member states to maintain their sphere of influence have in some cases led to double standards (Chad, Côte d"Ivoire, Zimbabwe). Moreover, the growing concern for self-interested security objectives such as the war on terror has led to increased tolerance for governments that are seen as crucial allies in fighting these security concerns (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad), while sanctions were more easily adopted where this was not the case (Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d"Ivoire). On the other hand, the study also found evidence that runs counter to the importance of self-interest: (1) commercial interests were found to have little explanatory value, (2) some countries that can also be considered allies in the security sphere were not shielded from negative measures (Kenya), and (3) the EU also avoided negatives measures in countries that were not allies in the pursuit of security objectives (Eritrea, Rwanda). Furthermore, the EU"s other normative objectives (stability, development) were found to be equally important. Negative measures were more easily adopted in countries where development performance had been weak (Zimbabwe, Guinea, Côte d"Ivoire, Niger) or where internal stability was under threat (Kenya, C...

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The European Endowment for Democracy

Datsiv

2024

The Palgrave Handbook of Non-State Actors in East-West Relations

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Instruments of the EU's External Democracy Promotion

Cited by 36 publications

References 15 publications

Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa

Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa

Norms, self-interest and effectiveness: explaining double standards in EU reactions to violations of democratic principles in Sub-Saharan Africa

The European Endowment for Democracy

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