Norms or Interests? Explaining Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa

Abstract

This article investigates the causes for instrumental variation in EU democracy promotion in Africa. Can instrumental variation better be explained from a realist or from an idealist perspective? Realism would predict that sanctions are more likely in the absence of historical, security or commercial interests. Idealism would suggest that sanctions are more likely in the case of grave violations of democracy and human rights, in countries that are unstable and economically underperforming, and when there is pressure from regional organizations and domestic actors. Empirically, the article compares two cases (Guinea and Niger) where the EU imposed sanctions and two non-cases (Ethiopia and Rwanda) where the EU was reluctant to do so. Contrary to the prevalent thesis in the literature, the article finds stronger evidence for idealism (which is confirmed in all the cases) than for realism (which is only confirmed in the cases of Guinea and Ethiopia).

Liberal Power Europe

“…Liberal power Europe concurs with NPE that sanctions are used as sticks to reinforce demands vis‐à‐vis third countries to adopt and comply with EU norms. At the same time, however, it takes the effects of sanctions on Member States' commercial interests seriously (del Biondo, ). Institutions then impact on the relative weight that ideational and economic preferences have on EU decision‐making and thus policy.…”

The EU's Democratization Discourse and Questions of European Identification

“…Experts of EU democracy promotion and democratization in particular have expressed reservations regarding the norms and values that the EU projects in the world, and how it does so. In del Biondo's (, p. 237) words ‘The literature on EU democracy promotion seems to agree with the realist assumption that democracy only drives foreign policy when there is no conflict between norms and interests’. Nevertheless, her own empirical investigations demonstrate that the variation of EU policy instruments aimed at democracy promotion in Africa are motivated by idealism rather than realism (ibid., p. 238).…”

Norm collision in the European Union’s external policies: The case of European Union sanctions towards Rwanda

“…A notable exception to the interest-based sanctions literature is the work of del Biondo (2011Biondo ( , 2015aBiondo ( , 2015b, who presents evidence that aid recipients that perform well in terms of social and economic development are excluded from EU sanctions. However this is only a first step, as no theoretical account is provided.…”

“…This hypothesis' validity would be indicated by actors not only evaluating to what extent a situation represents a breach of the conditionality principle as such (i.e., rigged elections as a breach of democracy), but also identifying other norms that are valid in the specific situation. What is often labelled 'development norms' are expected to be especially relevant, as they have been empirically shown to frequently clash with democracy and human rights (del Biondo, 2011Biondo, , 2015aBiondo, , 2015b. 3 For instance, the implementation of a sanction might be perceived as potentially weakening economic and social conditions in the target country.…”

“…The added value is the ability to explain why the EU chooses one norm over another when they point in different directions. This is arguably a much-needed contribution to the literature on the EU's global role, as empirical evidence suggests that the number of cases in which norms collide is increasing (del Biondo, 2011Biondo, , 2015aBiondo, , 2015b.…”