Institutions and the stabilization of party systems in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe

Andrews, Josephine T.; Bairett, Richard L.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.002

Cited by 19 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 51 publications

(56 reference statements)

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“…Whether presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently may also influence electoral volatility in Latin America. Andrews and Bairett (2014, p. 311) expand on Cox’s (1997) logic that as more elections are held simultaneously, party leaders will have a greater incentive to coordinate their activities. This coordination ultimately results in fewer parties.…”

Section: Literature Review and Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As we can see in the results of our study, disaggregating volatility into extra-system volatility and within-system volatility is important, as they appear to be driven by different variables or in opposite ways by the same variables. As Kuenzi et al (2019) note in their study of Africa, extra-system volatility has been on the rise, while Andrews and Bairett (2014) find that extrasystem volatility constitutes more of total volatility in Central and Eastern Europe than does within-system volatility. (In contrast, Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) and Powell and Tucker (2014) find that this type of volatility is declining in Africa and post-Communist Europe, respectively.)…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Role of International Factors in Electoral Volatility in Latin America: An Examination of Structural Adjustment

2021

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Does structural adjustment increase party system instability in Latin America? We employ the Latin American Presidential and Legislative Elections (LAPALE) database ( http://www.lapaledata.com ) and our own original data set for structural adjustment to assess the effects of structural adjustment and other economic, social, and political variables on legislative volatility in 18 Latin American countries during the period of 1982 to 2016. The results of our study indicate that structural adjustment results in higher levels of within-system electoral volatility and support a broad version of economic voting theory. Extra-system electoral volatility is driven primarily by institutional and demographic factors. Our findings also highlight the importance of disaggregating electoral volatility as within-system volatility and extra-system volatility appear to be largely driven by different factors, or in different ways by the same factors.

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Section: Literature Review and Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of International Factors in Electoral Volatility in Latin America: An Examination of Structural Adjustment

2021

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“…Different measures, however, do not just have impact on the explanatory power of volatility, but also on the causes and mechanisms associated with volatility. Bernhard and Karakoc's (2011) assessment of the links between volatility and inequality, Andrews and Bairett's (2014) Powell and Tucker's. Other countries produced more consistent evaluations but the consistency lasted only for a few election periods: Bulgaria is near the bottom of every author's scale of volatility for the first election period while the Czech Republic is at the bottom of nearly every scale for the second and third periods and Latvia and Lithuania are almost universally at the top of authors' scales for the first three electoral periods.…”

Section: Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

The volatility of volatility: Measuring change in party vote shares

2017

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“…Not only do executives differ from other elites, but heads of state and heads of government differ markedly from each other in their mandates and key authorities. Although considerable effort has gone into measuring presidential powers (Frye, 1997; Metcalf, 2000; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Siaroff, 2003) and showing that such powers influence outcomes (e.g., Andrews & Bairett, 2014b; Samuels & Shugart, 2010), a potential danger of coding only presidential strength is assuming that prime ministers are functionally equivalent across political systems and that their powers are unrelated to outcomes. Bergman, Müller, Strøm, and Blomgren (2003) show that parliamentary systems do vary considerably, and that political accountability varies as a result.…”

Section: Executive Power As a Determinant Of Media Freedommentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I test my hypotheses using 1993 to 2012 panel data from 16 democratizing, post-communist CEE countries that lacked an ongoing free-media tradition prior to democratization. 11 CEE political institutions were created and adjusted under political and economic uncertainty, borrowed a variety of features from existing democratic constitutions, and resulted in as close to a blank slate as we are likely to find to study the effect of institutions on outcomes (e.g., Andrews & Bairett, 2014b; Elster, Offe, & Preuss, 1998).…”

Section: Data and Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Executive Power and Media Freedom in Central and Eastern Europe

Bairett

2015

Comparative Political Studies

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Political executives often influence how effectively citizens can monitor them, yet the link between executives and government transparency is not well developed in the literature. I begin filling that void by illuminating the relationship between media freedom—one dimension of transparency—and executive power. I theorize that politicians prefer to avoid monitoring and negative publicity, and that both presidents and prime ministers often can do something about it via their constitutional powers and influence accrued through partisan support. Using new panel data on Central and Eastern European prime ministers and presidents, I find that proactive legislative powers for both executive types and increased partisan support for prime ministers negatively affect media freedom. My model explains most of the variation in Central and Eastern European media freedom, predicts high press freedom in Western Europe, and has important implications for the broader relationships between executive power, transparency, and accountability.

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Institutions and the stabilization of party systems in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe

Cited by 19 publications

References 51 publications

The Role of International Factors in Electoral Volatility in Latin America: An Examination of Structural Adjustment

The Role of International Factors in Electoral Volatility in Latin America: An Examination of Structural Adjustment

The volatility of volatility: Measuring change in party vote shares

Executive Power and Media Freedom in Central and Eastern Europe

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