This study examines the subnational flow in foreign direct investment (FDI) to Mexican states, with a focus on the finished vehicle industry. Although prior studies have examined subnational FDI in Mexico, research on the automobile sector has been scant. Utilizing a framework associated with the theory of asset specificity, we examine the influence of human capital and labor conditions, infrastructure, subnational policies, and security. The study employs a data set on finished vehicle FDI across 31 states and the Federal district for the period of 2004–2014. We adopt a two‐part model. The first part, which includes all states and the Federal district, is estimated with pooled logistic and Firth logistic regressions. In the second part, we examine variation in levels of FDI among states selected for investment with pooled ordinary least squares with panel‐corrected and Driscoll Kraay standard errors. Labor conditions are significant for both state selection and levels of FDI, but education is influential only in the selection stage. In addition, states with trunk rail lines linked to the U.S. border are more likely to be selected and receive higher FDI. After controlling for these influences, murder and homicide rates, and state development have no significant effects.

This article attempts to explain the decision of governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to grant expatriates voting rights in their country of origin. Focusing on 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries from 1980 to 2012, the study investigates the effects of remittance flows, globalization, leftist‐party control of the executive branch, and several other controls on the likelihood that governments will grant voting rights for their citizens residing abroad. The statistical models are estimated with Cox proportional hazard regression. The results add to the literature on migration by demonstrating that remittance flows influence the likelihood that governments will adopt policies granting expatriate voting rights, although the influence is non‐linear. Partisan control is also shown to be important, although the level of wealth, globalization, policy diffusion, and other controls were not found to be significant.

Despite the growth of scholarship on Chinese outward foreign direct investment, we still know little about the determinants of it at the subnational level within developing countries. This article seeks to fill that gap in the literature through a study of Chinese investment across 31 Mexican states and Mexico City (formerly the Federal District). Focusing on the period of 2004 to 2014, the analysis employs a two‐part estimation method to understand why Chinese firms select some Mexican states for investment, and what drives the level of investment among states selected. The first part is estimated with pooled logistic and Firth logistic regression with adjustments for serial correlation. The second stage equations are estimated with pooled OLS with panel‐corrected and Driscoll‐Kray standard errors, and adjustments for serial correlation. We find that market size, education, and partisan control in state government exhibit an influence on both the selection stage and the level of foreign direct investment. The presence of deep‐water ports in a state is also important in the selection stage. After controlling for these influences, the models suggest that mining resources, homicides, unionization, state taxes, and other factors have no significant effect in either stage.

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Due to its size and importance, the Mexican automobile industry was an important topic in negotiations for the usmca agreement. A particularly contentious issue was the allegation that foreign direct investment (fdi) in Mexican parts plants has been facilitated by autocratic unions affiliated with the Confederation of Mexican Workers (ctm). Although this issue has been widely noted, there has been little systematic research on the topic. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap in the literature. Using panel data, we examine the determinants of fdi in the automotive parts sector in Mexico’s 31 states and Mexico City (formerly df) from 2004 to 2018. The study makes four contributions to the literature. First, we demonstrate empirically that fdi in the sector concentrated in Mexican states with a higher lagged unionization rate. Second, controlling for the type of union organization, the study shows that fdi was positively associated with states where the ctm was already well-established in the automobile industry. Alternatively, fdi was negatively associated with states where independent and democratic unions had previously organized. Third, we clarify the conditions under which firms prefer pre-emptive unionization with the ctm to the alternative of union avoidance. Finally, the study points to the importance of education and transportation infrastructure in fdi decisions.