Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation

Hartzell, Jay C.; Starks, Laura T.

doi:10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.x

Cited by 1,668 publications

(955 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…CEO ownership only influences significantly cash compensation. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provide empirical evidence for a strong positive relation between institutional ownership concentration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation, as an evidence of the fact that large professional owner can be more sensible to the management incentive problem, and adopt more aggressive pay performance compensation. On a sample of Spanish firms, Crespi et al (2002) show that the presence of a large shareholder is associated with a large sensitivity of cash based executive compensation to changes in shareholder value, while in firms with a less concentrated ownership, modifications in managerial compensation depend upon changes in accounting returns in prior years.…”

Section: Ceo Ownership and Ceo Compensationmentioning

confidence: 97%

Determinants of CEO Compensation Evidence from UK Public Limited Companies

Buigut¹,

Soi²,

Koskei³

2014

IJBM

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In spite of more research on CEO compensation, where more of this research is anchored in agency or managerialist perspectives, less has been done on its determinants in firms. This paper contributes to the literature by determining the effect of Independent directors, CEO ownership and Profitability on executive cash compensation in UK. Agency theory informed the study. The study adopted an explanatory design Census technique was used as the study only included all the 20 firms for the past 3 years from 2008-2010. The study findings have shown that CEO ownership has a positive and significant effect on CEO compensation. The results have also show that the percentage of independent directors is significantly related to a decrease in the compensation levels of CEO compensation. Firm profitability was positively related to CEO compensation positing that CEOs salary as well as compensation increased with an increase in firm performance. It is therefore imperative for firms to link reward to corporate and individual performance so as to counter the agency problems. The interaction between corporate governance and CEO compensation is an avenue for more research for instance the relationship between shareholders and CEO compensation.

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Section: Ceo Ownership and Ceo Compensationmentioning

confidence: 97%

Determinants of CEO Compensation Evidence from UK Public Limited Companies

Buigut¹,

Soi²,

Koskei³

2014

IJBM

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“…The presence of block holders in the firm's ownership were assumed to facilitate better monitoring inducements leading to great performance (Leech & Leahy, 1991). Researchers such as Ongore (2011), Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Smith (1996) suggest that manager behavior can be constrained by the corporate monitoring done by the institutional investors/ block holders. Our approach also supports the earlier studies as well, so the hypothesis to test it can be:…”

Section: Block Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Bank Performance: A Study of Selected Banks in GCC Region

Naushad¹,

Syed²

2015

ASS

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This paper examines the effect of corporate governance denoted by board size, duality, agency cost etc. on the performance of selected 24 GCC banks based on the criteria of total assets for the financial year 2012-13. Tobin's Q and Return on Total Assets (ROTA) are adopted as a measurement of accounting and financial performance respectively.The results indicate that smaller boards are more capable for monitoring the management closely in GCC banking sector. Dual role of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) are likely to improve the GCC bank performance. The presence of block holders in ownership structure of GCC banks tends to have a positive effect on the performance of banking sector. Overall, the study concludes that the corporate governance poses a significant influence on the financial and accounting performance of GCC banking sector.

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“…Studying on institutional ownership, [35] argues that institutional ownership advances firm performance. [36] suggests that institutional ownership affects the relationship between ownership and firm value whereby increased in voting power and control enhances the firm performance.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ownership Structure and Bank Performance

Rahman¹,

Reja²

2015

JOEBM

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Abstract-This paper provides evidence on the impact of different types of ownership structure on bank performance. Using secondary data, the empirical analysis of this study is confined to Malaysian commercial banks during the period of 2000 to 2011. Multiple regression with fixed effects model is used to test the research model. Testing on five categories of ownership structure such as insider, family, government, institutional and foreign ownership, the results suggest that bank performance varies with different types of ownership structure.

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Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation

Cited by 1,668 publications

References 51 publications

Determinants of CEO Compensation Evidence from UK Public Limited Companies

Determinants of CEO Compensation Evidence from UK Public Limited Companies

Corporate Governance and Bank Performance: A Study of Selected Banks in GCC Region

Ownership Structure and Bank Performance

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