Institutional Design and Party Government in Post-Communist Europe

Nikolenyi, Csaba

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675302.001.0001

Cited by 10 publications

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“…Last, although authors have hitherto failed to make this connection, the potential for majorities that do not include (all) government parties in its composition challenges conventional assumptions that indirect presidential elections may 'reflect the parliamentary balance of powers rather than chang[e] it' (Schleiter and Morgan Jones, 2009, 508: see also Sieberer, 2013). Overall, the German case therefore supports Nikolenyi's (2014) assertion that government coalitions are less likely to capture the presidency if the rules for its selection diverge from those for electing the prime minister.…”

Section: The Electoral System and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Political parties are the dominant political actors throughout the process (cf. Helms 1998;Nikolenyi, 2014) and competition has hitherto been largely driven by the two Volksparteien Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD).…”

Section: The Electoral System and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indirect presidential elections are never a routine act for political parties and, given the potential of the office, they care strongly about who is chosen (Nikolenyi 2014). At the same time, these elections are publicly observed events and the process in itself may be almost as valuable to political parties as the eventual result (cf.…”

Section: Risk Vs Reward: When and Why Parties Nominate Epesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thereby, any party seeking to implement their policies or defend the status quo has a vested interest in influencing the selection of the head of state. Indirectly elected presidents can be key to tipping the political balance in one's favour where majorities are fragile (Hloušek, 2013;Tavits, 2008); furthermore, they are effectively agents of parliament (or electoral colleges; see Köker, 2017;Nikolenyi, 2014;cf. Tavits, 2008) and therefore rarely act against the preferences of their electoral majority (Köker, 2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Risk vs Reward Strategies in Indirect Presidential Elections: Political Parties and the Selection of Presidential Electors in Germany, 1949–2017

Köker¹

2019

German Politics

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Parties across parliamentary republics compete fiercely over capturing the presidential office. However, they are often torn between seeing their preferred candidate elected and exploiting the election for publicity purposes. The German case, specifically parties' ability to nominate extra-parliamentarian electors (EPEs) as part of the electoral college, offers a particularly interesting perspective on how parties balance these competing goals. While EPEs allow parties to boost their profile and strengthen ties with selected groups, they also present a risk factor as their voting behaviour is more difficult to predict. Based on a novel data set on party delegations in German presidential elections, 1949-2017, the analysis shows that-contrary to traditional assumptions-competition in the electoral college did not play a role in EPE nominations. Rather, party strategies were influenced by the varying signalling power of the elections. Parties were more risk-averse and nominated fewer EPEs during grand coalitions, when they were part of the federal government, or when federal elections approached, yet nominated more EPEs when they had a larger support base to reward. The results call for further comparative research on indirect elections and different types of EPEs in Germany.

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Section: The Electoral System and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Electoral System and Its Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Risk Vs Reward: When and Why Parties Nominate Epesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Risk vs Reward Strategies in Indirect Presidential Elections: Political Parties and the Selection of Presidential Electors in Germany, 1949–2017

Köker¹

2019

German Politics

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“…As a result, the legislature in Hungary was rendered exceedingly weak, and little emphasis was placed on popular control and government accountability outside of elections (Rose-Ackerman, 2005;Nikolenyi, 2014). During accession preparations, it was easy for the executive to push EU legislation and policy through parliament "because of the general support for EU accession as well as low interest and expertise of the MPs" (Ágh, 1999, 844).…”

Section: Executive Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

The Unintended Consequences of Democracy Promotion: International Organizations and Democratic Backsliding

Meyerrose

2020

Comparative Political Studies

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Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations (IOs) have engaged in unprecedented levels of democracy promotion, and research overwhelmingly links them to positive democratic outcomes. However, this increased emphasis on democracy has more recently been accompanied by rampant illiberalism and a sharp rise in cases of democratic backsliding in new democracies. What explains democratic backsliding in an age of unparalleled international support for democracy? Backsliding occurs when democratic institutions are weakened or eroded by elected officials, resulting in an illiberal or diminished form of democracy. I argue that IOs that support democracy unintentionally make backsliding more likely by neglecting to promote democratic institutions other than executives and elections, increasing executive power, and limiting states’ domestic policy options, which stunts institutional development. I find membership in IOs associated with democracy promotion makes backsliding more likely, decreases checks on executive power, and limits domestic policy options and party development in new democracies.

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Presidents in Government Formation and Censure

Köker

2017

Presidential Activism and Veto Power in Central and Eastern Europe

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Institutional Design and Party Government in Post-Communist Europe

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

Risk vs Reward Strategies in Indirect Presidential Elections: Political Parties and the Selection of Presidential Electors in Germany, 1949–2017

Risk vs Reward Strategies in Indirect Presidential Elections: Political Parties and the Selection of Presidential Electors in Germany, 1949–2017

The Unintended Consequences of Democracy Promotion: International Organizations and Democratic Backsliding

Presidents in Government Formation and Censure

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