2016
DOI: 10.5089/9781475570243.001
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Insolvency and Enforcement Reforms in Italy

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Cited by 10 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Sizeable NPL sales are planned in the coming year, which need to be implemented and backed up by strong and credible restructuring plans. Complementary measures include further advancing insolvency and enforcement reforms (beyond recent policy measures), and the facilitation of distressed debt markets (Garrido and others, 2016;Garrido, 2016;Jobst and Weber, 2016).…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Sizeable NPL sales are planned in the coming year, which need to be implemented and backed up by strong and credible restructuring plans. Complementary measures include further advancing insolvency and enforcement reforms (beyond recent policy measures), and the facilitation of distressed debt markets (Garrido and others, 2016;Garrido, 2016;Jobst and Weber, 2016).…”
Section: B Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…3 Cognizant of these challenges, the Italian authorities have legislated a number of reforms. Measures have aimed to tackle asset quality problems, including through changes to the insolvency and enforcement framework and state guarantees on certain types of NPL securities (Garrido and others, 2016;and Garrido, 2016). To spur consolidation of Italy's fragmented banking sector-there were around 400 consolidated banking groups and about 200 subsidiaries in end-2016-the authorities passed legislation to transform the governance structure of the larger cooperative (popolare) banks 3 There were substantial write-downs in 2016.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Italian insolvency regime is characterized by its high complexity, providing multiple procedures and debt restructuring tools that appear to lack coordination and a unified vision (see Garrido 2016). The system is divided between a generally applicable insolvency regime, and special regimes that apply to large enterprises, small enterprises and individuals, and enterprises subject to special supervisory regimes.…”
Section: B Legal Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, the positive relationship within countries over time between the zombie capital share and non-performing loans (NPLs; see Table A15) suggests that financial sector health is related to the operation of the exit margin. Indeed, the interaction of weak financial systems with inefficient insolvency regimes and judicial systems has been especially highlighted for Italy (Garrido et al, 2016;Garrido, 2016;OECD, 2015), and may explain the particularly tight relationship between NPLs and zombie shares in that country ( Figure A4). This suggests that more in-depth analysis of the relationship between banks and zombie firms, with a focus on banking sector fragility and the role of banking supervision may be warranted.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%