Inside the shadows: a survey of UK human source intelligence (HUMINT) practitioners, examining their considerations when handling a covert human intelligence source (CHIS)

Abstract

Law enforcement agencies in the UK are embracing evidence-based policing and recognise the importance of human source intelligence (HUMINT), in the decision-making process. A review of the literature identified six categories likely to impact the handling of a Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS), or an informant: (i) handler personality traits;(ii) informant motivation; (iii) rapport; (iv) gaining cooperation; (v) obtaining information, and; (vi) detecting deception. This study sought to identify which of these categories current HUMINT practitioners considered the most when planning and conducting a meeting with an informant. A bespoke online survey was designed and disseminated to 34 practitioners using purposive and snowball sampling. Directed Content Analysis and Thematic Content Analysis were conducted. Results indicate that practitioners appear most concerned with gaining co-operation (iv) and detecting deception (vi). Results also found an inter-connectivity between the six categories, with informant handlers often having to balance competing requirements. Implications for future research are discussed.

The use of self-disclosure to build rapport with mock covert human intelligence sources (CHIS)

“…It is unfortunate that in none of the exploratory studies on handlers' rapport perceptions (e.g. Birkett & Pike, 2017;Moffett et al, 2021;Nunan et al, 2020aNunan et al, , 2020b was noted which type of rapport-building strategies were conducive to an increased amount of intelligence yielded nor the quality of that intelligence.…”

“…A common theme voiced by practitioners in Nunan et al's work (see also Moffett, Oxburgh, Dresser, Watson, & Gabbert, 2021) is the lack of evidence-based handler training in interviewing and rapport-building techniques. Nunan et al (2020aNunan et al ( , 2020bNunan et al ( , 2020c recommend the development and implementation of a rapport-building and intelligence interviewing training programme for handlers.…”

“…This could jeopardise their willingness to unveil information about their criminal network's plans to a female handler. The scant open-source data on this topic suggests that the number of female handlers is lower than the number of male handlers -3 female vs 22 male handlers in Birkett and Pike (2017) and 7 female vs 34 male handlers in Moffett et al (2021). Furthermore, the first encounter between a source handler and a source typically takes place within police custody, during prisoner debrief meetings, or during port/airport stops (Nunan et al, 2020a) where the status and educational differences between the handler and the source are more likely to stand out (Billingsley, 2000).…”

“…In the covert arena, CHIS practitioners have identified the need for a psychologically research-based handler training programme on how to build rapport with (new) sources and what interviewing techniques to use (e.g. Billingsley, 2000;Moffett et al, 2021;Nunan et al, 2020a;2020b;2020c). At present, CHIS interviewing in the UK is not contained within the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984) provisions regarding the questioning of suspects, which is why handlers are left improvising, inappropriately interviewing sources (e.g.…”

Keeping our wits about us: introducing a bespoke informant interview model for covert human intelligence source (CHIS) interactions

“…The use of civilian informants to assist in the proactive prevention and detection of crime is a widespread tactic employed across many policing jurisdictions (Loftus et al, 2022). An informant could be described as any person providing information to a government agency regarding the actions or intentions of someone other than themselves with the expectation of confidentiality (Moffett et al, 2021). The United Kingdom (UK) government provide a legal definition of an informant as a Covert Human Intelligence Source ([CHIS] Home Office, 2021), however, Loftus et al (2022) argue that the covert status of an informant may provide a permissive environment for informant exploitation and unethical practices (see also Perry, 2021).…”