Innocence and burdens of proof in English criminal law

Abstract

Since the Human Rights Act 1998, scholars and courts have dedicated considerable attention to the presumption of innocence. A major strand of the ensuing debate has focused on the scope of this safeguard. Many academics have argued in favour of according to the presumption a substantiveas opposed to a procedural -role. In other words, these scholars maintain that the presumption set in art. 6(2) ECHR should have some influence on the definition of criminality. Courts seem sympathetic to this approach, albeit not following it to the full extent. The paper, instead, defends a procedural understanding of the presumption of innocence, on the basis of interpretive arguments concerning art. 6(2) ECHR. Besides, it shows that adopting this conception does not entail lowering the protection of the individual before the substantive criminal law.

Rethinking the relationship between reverse burdens and the presumption of innocence

“…For reasons which will shortly be made clear, I eschew both of the existing means of categorising the PoI here. The first approach is to categorise different ways of understanding the PoI as either ‘procedural’ or ‘substantive’ (Lippke, 2016: 20–21; Picinali, 2014: 244–248; Stumer, 2010: ch. 3).…”

“…On this account, the former understanding of the PoI is that it is purely ‘procedural in character’ and ‘concerns only the proof of facts at trial’ (Lippke, 2016: 20; Picinali, 2014: 245). Alternatively, the latter type of PoI is more robust and turns on a substantive theory of criminalisation or punishment: anything that leads to the conviction of someone for conduct that ought not to be criminalised or punished is a violation of the PoI on this account (Picinali, 2014: 245). As such, a substantive PoI entails broad normative claims which are centred on some thicker notion of what conduct is and is not justly criminalisable.…”

“…In fact, one consequence of the increasingly jargon-filled debate about the PoI and its limits has been a profound sense of confusion when discussing the application of the PoI to reverse burdens. 7 To see this confusion in action, one need only revisit Picinali’s claim that whether or not a reverse burden is PoI-compatible cannot be known without first committing to either a substantive or proceduralist interpretation of the PoI (Picinali, 2014: 244–245). Picinali reaches this conclusion by reference to a hypothetical example, which is worth reproducing in full here:David is charged with possessing an imitation firearm that is readily convertible into a firearm ‘so designed or adapted that two or more missiles can be successively discharged without repeated pressure on the trigger’.…”

“…The offence is constructed by combining section 5(1)(a) of the Firearms Act 1968 with sections 1(1) and 1(2) of the Firearms Act 1982…However, s. 1(5) of the 1982 Act states that ‘it shall be a defence for the accused to show that he did not know and had no reason to suspect that the imitation firearm was so constructed or adapted as to be readily convertible into a firearm’…Does the provision amount to a violation of the presumption of innocence? (Picinali, 2014: 244–245 (footnotes omitted). )After setting up this hypothetical, Picinali moves on to claim that there is no settled answer to this question, ‘the answer being a function of how the presumption of innocence is understood’ (Picinali, 2014: 245).…”

El carácter presuntivo de las presunciones absolutas

“…No puedo detenerme aquí en esta compleja cuestión, solo me interesa resaltar que ella está vinculada estrechamente con la aceptación (o no) de ciertos enunciados fácticos qua verdaderos. Véanse Illuminati 1979, Vázquez Sotelo 1984, Garofoli 2000, Grevi 2000, Carrió 2005, Fernández López 2005, Laudan 2005, Paulesu 2009, Ferrer Beltrán 2010, Picinali 2014, Roberts 2014, Tomlin 2014, Scurich, Nguyen & John 2015, Stumer 2018 En este último sentido, las cosas podrían complejizarse todavía más, ya que 'presunción' puede aludir a la asunción en términos de lo que Bertrand Russell bautizó actitud proposicional o bien en términos de lo que J. L. Austin llamó acto ilocucionario. Véase la presentación general de Santibáñez 2011.…”